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Abstract 
Under Article V of the U.S. Constitution, two thirds of state 
legislatures may require Congress to call a “Convention for proposing 
Amendments.” Because this procedure has never been used, 
commentators frequently debate the composition of the convention and 
the rules governing the application and convention process. However, 
the debate has proceeded almost entirely without knowledge of the 
many multi-colony and multi-state conventions held during the 
eighteenth century, of which the Constitutional Convention was only 
one. These conventions were governed by universally-accepted 
convention practices and protocols. This Article surveys those 
conventions and shows how their practices and protocols shaped the 
meaning of Article V. 
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 1. Bibliographical Note: This footnote collects alphabetically the secondary sources 
cited more than once, including several of the author’s prior publications. The sources and short 
form citations used are as follows: 
Government Records Cited Multiple Times 
Connecticut: 1, 2 & 3 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (Charles J. Hoadly 
ed., Hartford, Case, Lockwood & Brainard Co. 1894, 1895, 1922) [hereinafter CONN. RECORDS]. 
Delaware: MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL OF THE DELAWARE STATE FROM 1776 TO 1792 (Dover, 
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James Kirk & Son 1886) [hereinafter MINUTES, DELAWARE COUNCIL]; PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF THE DELAWARE STATE 1781–1792 AND OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1792 (Claudia L. Bushman, Harold B. Hancock, & Elizabeth Moyne Homsey 
eds., 1988) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS, DELAWARE ASSEMBLY]. 
Massachusetts: 19, 20 & 21 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE 
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1918, 1918, 1922); ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, 1780–1781 (n.p., Wright and Potter Printing Co. 1890) [collectively 
hereinafter MASS. RECORDS]. 
Maryland: VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE STATE OF 
MARYLAND, Nov. Session, 1785 [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS, MD. HOUSE OF DELEGATES]. 
New Jersey: SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE OF NEW JERSEY, FROM 
1776 TO 1786 (Newark, Newark Daily Advertiser Office 1848) [hereinafter N. J. SELECTIONS]. 
New York: DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
(E.B. O’Callaghan et al. eds., 1855) [hereinafter N.Y. RECORDS]; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK (E.B. O’Callaghan, 1849) [hereinafter N.Y. HISTORY]. 
Pennsylvania: MINUTES OF THE SUPREME EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF PENNSYLVANIA (Samuel 
Hazard ed., 1853) [hereinafter PA. RECORDS]; 1 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA (John Dunlap ed., 1782) [hereinafter PA. 
JOURNALS]; MINUTES OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, Hall & Sellers 1785) [hereinafter MINUTES, 
PA. ASSEMBLY]; MINUTES OF THE SUPREME EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF PENNSYLVANIA (Harrisburg, 
Theo. Fenn & Co. 1853) [hereinafter MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL]; 10 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 
(Samuel Hazard ed., Philadelphia, Joseph Severns & Co. 1854) [hereinafter PA. ARCHIVES]. 
Rhode Island: RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS IN 
NEW ENGLAND (John Russell Bartlett ed., Providence, A. Crawford Greene 1862, 1963, 1864) 
[hereinafter R.I. RECORDS]. 
United States: JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789 (Worthington Chauncey 
Ford, Gaillard Hunt, & Roscoe R. Hill eds., 1904–1936) [hereinafter J. CONT. CONG.]. 
Other collections 
AMERICAN ARCHIVES, FIFTH SERIES (Peter Force ed., 1853) [hereinafter AMERICAN ARCHIVES]. 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Merrill Jensen, John 
P. Kaminski, & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1976–2012) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
1, 2 & 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
INDIAN TREATIES PRINTED BY BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (Carl Van Doren & Julian P. Boyd eds., 
1938) [hereinafter FRANKLIN, INDIAN TREATIES]. 
2, 3, 4 & 5 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 
1921) [hereinafter LETTERS]. 
THE PAPERS OF JOSIAH BARTLETT (Frank C. Mevers ed., 1979) [hereinafter BARTLETT PAPERS]. 
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONVENTION OF DELEGATES FROM SEVERAL OF THE NEW-ENGLAND STATES, 
HELD AT BOSTON, AUGUST 3–9, 1780 (Franklin B. Hough ed., Albany, J. Munsell 1867) 
[hereinafter BOSTON PROCEEDINGS]. 
Books and Articles 
Simeon E. Baldwin, The New Haven Convention of 1778, reprinted in THREE HISTORICAL 
PAPERS READ BEFORE THE NEW HAVEN COLONY HISTORICAL SOCIETY 33 (New Haven, Tuttle, 
Morehouse & Taylor 1882) [hereinafter Baldwin]. 
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE 
L.J. 957 (1963) [hereinafter Black]. 
WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo 
3
Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
618 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE CONFUSION 
The United States Constitution authorizes two methods by which 
amendments may be proposed for ratification: (1) by a two thirds 
majority of each house of Congress or (2) by a “Convention for 
proposing Amendments,” which Congress is required to call upon 
receiving applications from two thirds of the state legislatures.2 
                                                                                                                     
Press, Da Capo Press Reprint ed. 1970) (1905) [hereinafter BROWN]. 
RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY 
NATIONAL CONVENTION (1988) [hereinafter CAPLAN]. 
THE FEDERALIST (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund, Gideon ed. 2001) 
[hereinafter THE FEDERALIST]. 
THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY (Francis Jennings et al. eds, 1985) 
[hereinafter IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY]. 
Scott Lillard, The Cement of Interest: Interstate Canals and the Transition from the Articles of 
Confederation to the Constitution, 1783–1787 (2012) (on file with author). Robert G. Natelson, 
Amending the Constitution by Convention: A More Complete View of the Founders’ Plan 
(Independence Institute, Working Paper No. IP-7-2010, 2010) [hereinafter Natelson, Founders’ 
Plan], available at http://constitution.i2i.org/files/2010/12/IP _7_2010_a.pdf. 
Robert G. Natelson, Amending the Constitution by Convention: Lessons for Today from the 
Constitution’s First Century, (Independence Institute, Working Paper No. IP-5-2011, 2011) 
[hereinafter Natelson, First Century], available at http://liberty.i2i.org/files/2012/03/IP_5_2011 
_c.pdf. 
Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules Governing the 
Process, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693 (2011) [hereinafter Natelson, Rules]. 
ROBERT C. NEWBOLD, THE ALBANY CONGRESS AND PLAN OF UNION OF 1754 (1955) [hereinafter 
NEWBOLD]. 
CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966) [hereinafter ROSSITER]. 
Benjamin Rush, Historical Notes of Dr. Benjamin Rush, 1777, 27 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 
129 (1903) (comp. S. Weir Mitchell) [hereinafter Rush, Notes]. 
Kenneth Scott, Price Control in New England During the Revolution, 19 NEW ENG. Q. 453 
(1946). 
TIMOTHY J. SHANNON, INDIANS AND COLONISTS AT THE CROSSROADS OF EMPIRE: THE ALBANY 
CONGRESS OF 1754 (2000) [hereinafter SHANNON]. 
Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention 
to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, Statement Before the Committee on Ways and 
Means of the California State Assembly (Feb. 1, 1979), reprinted in 10 PAC. L.J. 627 (1979) 
[hereinafter Tribe]. 
HARRY M. WARD, UNITE OR DIE: INTERCOLONY RELATIONS 1690-1763 (1971) [hereinafter 
WARD] 
C.A. WESLAGER, THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS (1776) (hereinafter WESLAGER). 
 2. The relevant language is as follows: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the 
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a 
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to 
all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed 
by the Congress. . . . 
4
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Although state legislatures have applied repeatedly, at no time has the 
necessary minimum of two thirds been reached on any one topic, so 
Congress has never called an amendments convention. 
In recent decades, commentators have expressed uncertainty about 
the scope of an amendments convention, the effectiveness of limits on 
its charge, how delegates should be selected, and who should determine 
its operative rules.3 They also have posed the question of whether it is 
essentially (to use James Madison’s dichotomy)4 a “national” or a 
“federal” body. In other words, is it a national assembly elected by the 
people and presumably apportioned by population? Or is it an assembly 
of delegates representing the states?5 
Many of these questions arise because of a general failure to 
examine sufficiently the history behind and surrounding Article V. For 
example, the late Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. of Yale Law School 
concluded that an amendments convention is a “national” rather than 
“federal” body.6 He deduced this conclusion without referring to 
anything the Founders had to say on the matter and while under the 
misimpression that the only relevant precedent was the 1787 
Constitutional Convention.7 Other questions derive from the ahistorical 
error of assuming that an amendments convention is the same thing as a 
constitutional convention,8 despite clear historical differences between 
the two.9  
                                                                                                                     
U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). 
 3. E.g., Tribe, supra note 1, at 634–40. Some commentators argue that Congress should 
decide all or some of those questions. See, e.g., Samuel J. Ervin, Proposed Legislation to 
Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 875, 879, 
892 (1968).  
 4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 1, at 196–99 (James Madison). 
 5. E.g., Black, supra note 1, at 964–65. 
 6. Id.  
 7. See id. 
 8. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional 
Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 738 (1993) (“[T]here can be no 
such thing as a ‘limited’ constitutional convention. A constitutional convention, once called, is a 
free agency.”). 
 9. In a nutshell, the difference is as follows: a constitutional convention is a body that 
drafts an entirely new constitution, often (although not always) outside any pre-existing 
constitutional structure. Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 5–7. An amendments 
convention meets pursuant to the Constitution and is essentially a drafting committee for 
determining the language of amendments addressing subjects identified in the state legislative 
applications. Id.; see also Ann Stuart Diamond, A Convention for Proposing Amendments: The 
Constitution’s Other Method, 11 PUBLIUS 113, 137 (“An Article V convention could propose 
one or many amendments, but it is not for the purpose of ‘an unconditional reappraisal of 
constitutional foundations.’ Persisting to read Article V in this way, so that it contemplates a 
constitutional convention that writes—not amends—a constitution, is often a rhetorical ploy to 
terrify sensible people.” (footnote omitted)). Confusion between the two first arose in the 
nineteenth century, sowed by opponents of the process. See Natelson, First Century, supra note 
5
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What nearly all commentators have overlooked10 is that the Framers 
did not write, nor did the Ratifiers adopt, Article V on a blank slate. 
They wrote and ratified against the background of a long tradition of 
multi-colony and multi-state conventions. During the century before the 
drafting of Article V, there had been at least 32 such gatherings—at 
least 21 before Independence11 and another eleven between 1776 and 
1786.12 In addition, there had been several abortive, although still 
instructive, convention calls. These multi-government gatherings were 
the direct predecessors of the convention for proposing amendments, 
and formed the model upon which the convention for proposing 
amendments was based. 
Universally-accepted protocols determined multi-government 
convention procedures. These protocols fixed the acceptable ways of 
calling such conventions, selecting and instructing delegates, adopting 
convention rules, and conducting convention proceedings. The actors 
involved in the process—state legislatures and executives, the 
Continental and Confederation Congresses, and the delegates 
themselves—each had recognized prerogatives and duties, and were 
subject to recognized limits.13 
These customs are of more than mere Founding-Era historical 
interest. They governed, for the most part, multi-state conventions held 
in the nineteenth century as well—notably but not exclusively, the 
Washington Conference Convention of 1861.14 More importantly for 
present purposes, they shaped the Founders’ understanding of how the 
constitutional language would be interpreted and applied. 
Moreover, the Constitution, as a legal document, must be understood 
in the context of the jurisprudence of the time. In that jurisprudence, 
custom was a key definer of the “incidents” or attributes that 
accompanied principal (i.e., express) legal concepts and powers.15 Thus, 
                                                                                                                     
1, at 10. Today it is rampant in the legal literature and other areas of public discourse. See, e.g., 
Tribe, supra note 1 (calling an amendments convention a “constitutional convention”). 
 10. Russell L. Caplan is an important exception. See CAPLAN, supra note 1. 
 11. Infra Part II.A (listing conventions).  
 12. Infra Part III.C–III.O (listing and discussing post-Independence convention).  
 13. Infra Part III.  
 14. The Washington Conference Convention was a gathering of 21 states called by 
Virginia in an effort to propose a constitutional amendment that would avoid the Civil War. See 
ROBERT GRAY GUNDERSON, OLD GENTLEMEN’S CONVENTION: THE WASHINGTON PEACE 
CONFERENCE OF 1861 (1961). This convention followed eighteenth century convention protocol 
virtually to the letter. See, e.g., id. at 48 (describing “one state, one vote” rule). See also THELMA 
JENNINGS, THE NASHVILLE CONVENTION: SOUTHERN MOVEMENT FOR UNITY, 1848–1850 (1980) 
(describing the nine-state Nashville Convention of 1850, which followed the same voting rule). 
Id. at 137–38.  
 15. The Founding-Era law of principals and incidents and its implication for constitutional 
interpretation are discussed in Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, in GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. 
6
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the customs by which the founding generation initiated and conducted 
interstate conventions tell us how an Article V convention should be 
initiated and conducted; further, they help define the powers and 
prerogatives of the actors in the process. But beyond that, there is 
considerable affirmative evidence that the Founders specifically 
understood these customs to define the language of Article V. These 
practices enable us to re-capture the constitutional meaning of the terms 
“Application,” “call,” and “Convention for proposing Amendments.”16 
Part I of this Article explains why the Founders inserted the 
convention method for proposing amendments into the Constitution. 
Part II introduces the early-American convention tradition and some of 
its terminology. Part III summarizes the protocols for fourteen multi-
colony and multi-state conventions held between 1754 and 1787, and 
also discusses the procedures employed for calling several abortive 
conventions. Part IV collects the evidence showing that the established 
protocols inhere in Article V. Part IV also explains that the Constitution 
specifies rules for the few cases in which there were procedural 
variations. The discussion concludes with an explanation of how the 
practice surrounding the predecessor conventions impacts the rules for 
amendments conventions today. Two Appendices follow, the first 
listing alphabetically the delegates to the fourteen conventions 
examined in detail, and the second listing the same delegates by state. 
I.  WHY THE CONSTITUTION INCLUDES A PROPOSING CONVENTION AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSAL 
Article V grants powers17 to two principal sorts of assemblies: 
legislatures, both state and federal; and conventions, both state and 
federal. It assigns in-state conventions the task of ratifying or rejecting 
the Constitution itself18 and (when Congress so determines) the task of 
ratifying or rejecting proposed amendments.19 Article V assigns to a 
general convention power to propose amendments.20 
The initial draft of the Constitution, composed by the Committee of 
Detail, provided that “This Constitution ought to be amended whenever 
such Amendment shall become necessary; and on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, the Legislature of 
                                                                                                                     
SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52, 60–68 (2010). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 17. The assemblies designated in Article V exercise “federal functions” derived from the 
Constitution. State legislatures and conventions do not exercise reserved powers pursuant to the 
Tenth Amendment. Natelson, Rules, supra note 1, at 703 (collecting cases). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 19. Id. art. V. 
 20. Id.; see infra note 63 and accompanying text on the meaning of “general convention.” 
7
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the United States shall call a Convention for that Purpose.”21 In other 
words, the states would trigger a process requiring Congress to call a 
convention, which in turn would draft, and possibly adopt, all 
amendments. Gouverneur Morris successfully proposed permitting 
Congress, as well as the states, to initiate the amendment process.22 
When the document emerged from the Committee of Style, it appeared 
to give Congress exclusive power to propose amendments for state 
ratification.23 George Mason then objected because he feared Congress 
might become abusive or refuse to adopt necessary or desirable 
amendments, particularly those curbing its own power.24 For this 
reason, the draft was changed to insert the convention for proposing 
amendments to enable the states to propose amendments without a 
substantive veto by Congress.25 The immediate inspiration for the 
application procedure seems to have been a provision in the Georgia 
constitution whereby a majority of counties could demand amendments 
on designated topics, and require the legislature to call a convention to 
draft the language.26 
It was well for the Constitution that the state application and 
convention procedure was added. Without it, the document may never 
have been ratified. This is because many believed the Constitution could 
lead to congressional abuse and overreaching, and that Congress would 
                                                                                                                     
 21. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 159.  
 22. Id. at 468 (Aug. 30, 1787); see also id. at 558 (Sept. 10, 1787) (“The National 
Legislature will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of 
amendments. . . .” (quoting Alexander Hamilton)). 
 23. Id. at 578 (Aug. 30, 1787) (“The Legislature of the United States, whenever two thirds 
of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of 
the several States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution . . . .”). 
 24. The record, paraphrasing George Mason, stated: 
As the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to depend, in the first 
immediately, and in the second, ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the 
proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should 
become oppressive, as [Mason] verily believed would be the case. 
Id. at 629 (Sept. 15, 1787).  
 25. See id. at 629–30. 
 26. Georgia’s constitution provided that: 
No alteration shall be made in this constitution without petitions from a 
majority of the counties . . . at which time the assembly shall order a 
convention to be called for that purpose, specifying the alterations to be made, 
according to the petitions preferred to the assembly by the majority of the 
counties as aforesaid. 
GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII. The Committee of Detail’s draft convention looked 
much like the Georgia provision. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 188. 
8
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be unlikely to curb itself.27 The state application and convention 
procedure of Article V provided the Constitution’s advocates with a 
basis for arguing that the system was a balanced one,28 and that 
Congress could be bypassed, if appropriate.29 Illustrative are comments 
by the widely-read Federalist essayist Tench Coxe: 
It has been asserted, that the new constitution, when 
ratified, would be fixed and permanent, and that no 
alterations or amendments, should those proposed appear 
on consideration ever so salutary, could afterwards be 
obtained. A candid consideration of the constitution will 
shew [sic] this to be a groundless remark. It is provided, in 
the clearest words, that Congress shall be obliged to call a 
convention on the application of’ two thirds of the 
legislatures; and all amendments proposed by such 
convention, are to be valid when approved by the 
conventions or legislatures of three fourths of the states. It 
                                                                                                                     
 27. An Old Whig I, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 376–77 (”[W]e shall never find two thirds of a 
Congress voting or proposing anything which shall derogate from their own authority and 
importance”); see also A Plebeian, An Address to the People of the State of New York, Apr. 17, 
1788, reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 942, 944 (“The amendments 
contended for as necessary to be made, are of such a nature, as will tend to limit and abridge a 
number of the powers of the government. And is it probable, that those who enjoy these powers 
will be so likely to surrender them after they have them in possession, as to consent to have 
them restricted in the act of granting them? Common sense says—they will not.”). 
 28. E.g., 23 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2522 (Feb. 4, 1789) (reproducing 
remarks of Samuel Rose, that Congress could propose amendments if it did not have sufficient 
power and the states, acting through the convention, could propose if it had too much). 
 29. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 101 (“[Patrick Henry] thinks amendments can 
never be obtained, because so great a number is required to concur. Had it rested solely with 
Congress, there might have been danger. The committee will see that there is another mode 
provided, besides that which originated with Congress. On the application of the legislatures of 
two thirds of the several states, a convention is to be called to propose amendments. . . .” 
(quoting George Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention)); James Iredell, at the North 
Carolina ratifying convention, also explained:  
The proposition for amendments may arise from Congress itself, when two 
thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary. If they should not, and yet 
amendments be generally wished for by the people, two thirds of the 
legislatures of the different states may require a general convention for the 
purpose, in which case Congress are under the necessity of convening one. Any 
amendments which either Congress shall propose, or which shall be proposed 
by such general convention, are afterwards to be submitted to the legislatures of 
the different states, or conventions called for that purpose, as Congress shall 
think proper, and, upon the ratification of three fourths of the states, will 
become a part of the Constitution. 
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 177. 
9
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must therefore be evident to every candid man, that two 
thirds of the states can always procure a general convention 
for the purpose of amending the constitution, and that three 
fourths of them can introduce those amendments into the 
constitution, although the President, Senate and Federal 
House of Representatives, should be unanimously opposed 
to each and all of them. Congress therefore cannot hold any 
power, which three fourths of the states shall not approve, 
on experience.30 
II.  OVERVIEW OF PRIOR AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH CONVENTIONS, 
AND THEIR RECORDS AND TERMINOLOGY 
A.  Conventions Before the Constitution 
The Founders understood a political “convention” to be an assembly, 
other than a legislature, designed to undertake prescribed governmental 
functions.31 The convention was a familiar and approved device: several 
generations of Englishmen and Americans had resorted to them. In 1660 
a “convention Parliament” had recalled the Stuart line, in the person of 
Charles II, to the throne of England.32 A 1689 convention Parliament 
had adopted the English Bill of Rights, declared the throne vacant, and 
invited William and Mary to fill it.33 Also in 1689, Americans resorted 
to at least four conventions in three different colonies as mechanisms to 
replace unpopular colonial governments, and in 1719 they held yet 
another.34 
During the run-up to Independence, conventions within particular 
colonies issued protests, operated as legislatures when the de jure 
legislature had been dissolved, and removed British officials and 
governed in their absence.35 After Independence, conventions wrote 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Tench Coxe, A Friend of Society and Liberty, PA. GAZETTE, July 23, 1788, reprinted 
in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 277, 283–84 (alteration added) (emphasis in 
original). Coxe made the same points in A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention, PA. 
GAZETTE, Jun. 11, 1788, reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1139, l142. 
Coxe had been Pennsylvania’s delegate to the Annapolis convention. 
 31. Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 6; see also In re Op. of the Justices, 167 A. 
176, 179 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1933) (“The principal distinction between a convention and a 
Legislature is that the former is called for a specific purpose, the latter for general purposes.”); 
CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 5–6 (discussing the development of the word “convention” in the 
seventeenth century). 
 32. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 5; see also Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 6.  
 33. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 5; Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 6. 
 34. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 6–7 (discussing two conventions in Massachusetts, one in 
New York, one in Maryland, and one in South Carolina). 
 35. See id. at 8–10. 
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several state constitutions.36 
Those state constitutions also resorted to conventions as elements of 
their amendment procedures. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 
and the Vermont Constitution of 1786 both authorized amendments 
conventions limited as to subjects by a “council of censors.”37 The 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided for amendment by 
convention.38 The Georgia Constitution of 1777 required the legislature 
to call a convention to draft constitutional amendments whose gist had 
been prescribed by a majority of counties.39 
Conventions within individual colonies or states represented the 
people, towns, or counties.40 Another sort of “convention” was a 
                                                                                                                     
 36. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 10–13. Sometimes a joint session of the legislature met as a 
convention to write a constitution, as happened with the unsuccessful Massachusetts constitution 
of 1777. 20 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 315. 
 37. Pennsylvania’s original constitution provided, in relevant part: 
The said council of censors shall also have power to call a convention, to meet 
within two years after their sitting, if there appear to them an absolute necessity 
of amending any article of the constitution which may be defective, explaining 
such as may be thought not clearly expressed, and of adding such as are 
necessary for the preservation of the rights and happiness of the people: But the 
articles to be amended, and the amendments proposed, and such articles as are 
proposed to be added or abolished, shall be promulgated at least six months 
before the day appointed for the election of such convention, for the previous 
consideration of the people, that they may have an opportunity of instructing 
their delegates on the subject. 
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47; see also VT. CONST. of 1786, art. XL (similar language). 
 38. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 stated that: 
[T]he general court which shall be in the year of our Lord [1795] shall issue 
precepts to the selectmen of the several towns, and to the assessors of the 
unincorporated plantations, directing them to convene the qualified voters of 
their respective towns and plantations, for the purpose of collecting their 
sentiments on the necessity or expediency of revising the constitution in order 
to [sic] amendments.  
And if it shall appear, by the returns made, that two-thirds of the qualified 
voters throughout the State, who shall assemble and vote in consequence of the 
said precepts, are in favor of such revision or amendment, the general court 
shall issue precepts, or direct them to be issued from the secretary’s office, to 
the several towns to elect delegates to meet in convention for the purpose 
aforesaid.  
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. VI, art. X. 
 39. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII. 
 40. HOAR, supra note 1, at 2–10 (describing state constitutional conventions at the 
Founding); see also CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 8–16 (also discussing conventions). Thus, state 
conventions for ratifying the Constitution represented the people. See, e.g., 3 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 110 (setting forth the Delaware form of ratification); id. at 275–78 
(setting forth the Georgia form of ratification); id. at 560 (setting forth the Connecticut form of 
11
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gathering of three or more American governments under protocols 
modeled on international diplomatic practice.41 These multi-government 
conventions were comprised of delegations from each participating 
government, including, on some occasions, Indian tribes. Before 
Independence, such gatherings often were called “congresses,” because 
“congress” was an established term for a gathering of sovereignties.42 
After Independence, they were more often called “conventions,”43 
presumably to avoid confusion with the Continental and Confederation 
Congresses. But both before44 and after45 Independence the terms could 
be employed interchangeably. 
Multi-government congresses or conventions were particularly 
common in the Northeast, perhaps because governments in that region 
had a history of working together. In 1643 the four colonies of 
Massachusetts, Plymouth Colony, Connecticut, and New Haven formed 
the United Colonies of New England. Essentially a joint standing 
committee of colonial legislatures, this association was not always 
active, but endured at least formally until 1684.46 In 1695, the Crown 
created the Dominion of New England, a unified government imposed 
on New England, New York, and New Jersey.47 The Dominion proved 
                                                                                                                     
ratification); cf. In re Op. of the Justices, 167 A. 176, 179 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1933) (noting that 
conventions within states directly represented the people). 
 41. There also were many meetings of representatives of only two colonial 
governments—for example, the 1684 and 1746 conferences with the Iroquois, and the 1785 
meeting between Maryland and Virginia at Mount Vernon, but two-sovereign meetings seem 
not to have been called “conventions.” IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY, supra note 1, at 161, 182, 201. On 
the pre-Independence conferences with the Iroquois, see generally id. at 157–208; see generally 
FRANKLIN, INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 1. 
 42. See, e.g., THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1789) (defining “congress” in part as “an appointed meeting for settlement of affairs between 
different nations”). 
 43. SeeParts III.D through III.O (discussing post-Independence multi-state conventions)..  
 44. See, e.g., 2 N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 545 (reproducing Massachusetts 
commission to Albany Congress, referring to it as “a General convention of Commissioners for 
their Respective Governments”); 1 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 17 (reproducing the 
Connecticut credentials for the First Continental Congress, which empower Connecticut’s 
delegates to attend the “congress, or convention of commissioners, or committees of the several 
Colonies”); DANIEL LEONARD, MASSACHUSETTENSIS 106 (Boston, 1775) (referring to the Albany 
Congress as a “congress or convention of committees from the several colonies”). 
 45. Rush, Notes, supra note 1, at 129 (Dec. 25, 1776) (referring to the Providence 
Convention as “a Congress composed of Deputies from the 4 New Engd [sic] States”); Letter 
from Daniel St. Thomas Jenifer to Thomas Sim Lee (Sept. 26, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra note 
1, at 391–92 (calling the 1780 Boston Convention a “Congress or Convention”); Gov. James 
Bowdoin, Speech before Council Chamber (May 31, 1785), reprinted in 1784-85 MASS. 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 706, 710 (referring to a proposed general convention as a 
“Convention or Congress” of “special delegates from the States”). 
 46. NEWBOLD, supra note 1, at 24–25. 
 47. Id. at 1, at 26. 
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unpopular, and in 1689 colonial conventions swept it away; 
nevertheless, northeastern governments continued to confer together. 
Many of these meetings were conclaves of colonial governors, usually 
conferring on issues of defense against French Canada and her allied 
Indian tribes, rather than conventions of diplomatic delegations.48 An 
example from outside the Northeast was the meeting of five governors 
held at Alexandria, Virginia in 1755.49 Many others, however, were 
full-dress conventions among commissioners appointed from three or 
more colonies. These meetings were usually, but not always, held under 
the sanction of royal authorities. 
To be specific: Three colonies met at Boston in 1689 to discuss 
defense issues.50 The following year, the acting New York lieutenant 
governor called, without royal sanction, a defense convention of most of 
the continental colonies to meet in New York City. The meeting was 
held on May 1, 1690, with New York, Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, 
and Plymouth colonies in attendance.51 A similar gathering occurred in 
1693 in New York, this time under Crown auspices.52 Other defense 
conventions were held in New York City in 1704,53 Boston in 1711,54 
Albany in 1744 and 1745,55 and New York City in 1747.56 The New 
England colonies held yet another in 1757.57 
In addition to defense conventions, there were conventions serving 
as diplomatic meetings among colonies and sovereign Indian tribes, 
particularly the Iroquois. There were at least ten such conclaves 
between 1677 and 1768 involving three or more colonies. Those ten 
included gatherings in 1677, 1689, 1694, and 1722 at Albany, New 
York; in 1744 at Lancaster, Pennsylvania; in 1745, 1746, 1751, and 
1754 at Albany; and in 1768 at Fort Stanwix (Rome), New York.58 
                                                                                                                     
 48. See generally, WARD, supra note 1, at 52–65 (summarizing war conferences and 
conventions).  
 49. Id. at 58.  
 50. Id. at 52.  
 51. Id. at 52–53. The brief proceedings are in 2 N.Y. HISTORY, supra note 1, at 134–35.  
 52. WARD, supra note 1, at 53–54.  
 53. Id. at 54.  
 54. Id. at 56.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 56–57.  
 57. Id. at 62.  
 58. IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY, supra note 1, at 160, 161, 173, 181 (listing two), 182, 185, 187, 
190 & 197.WARD, supra note 1, adds the conventions held in 1689, 1694, and 1746. Id. at 131, 
133 & 139. NEWBOLD, supra, note 1, at 28, seems to be counting Indian conferences at which 
only one colony attended. He specifically names as multi-state gatherings only the 1744 
Lancaster, Pennsylvania convention (Indians plus Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia); a 
1748 (possibly an error for 1746) Albany meeting (Indians plus Massachusetts and New York); 
and a 1751 gathering, also in Albany (Indians plus Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and 
South Carolina). Id. Cf. SHANNON, supra, note 1, at 132 & 133 (adding the 1745 Albany 
13
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The assembly at Lancaster became one of the more noted.  
Participants included Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and several 
Indian tribes. The proceedings lasted from June 22 to July 4, 1744, and 
produced the Treaty of Lancaster.59 Even more important, however, was 
the seven-colony Albany Congress of 1754, whose proceedings are 
discussed in Part III.A. 
The most famous inter-colonial conventions were the Stamp Act 
Congress of 1765 and the First Continental Congress of 1774, discussed 
in Parts IV.B and IV.C. As for the Second Continental Congress (1775-
81), participants might initially have thought of it as a convention, but it 
is not so classified here because it really served as a continuing 
legislature. 
After the colonies had declared themselves independent states, they 
continued to gather in conventions. All of these meetings were called to 
address specific issues of common concern. Northeastern states 
convened twice in Providence, Rhode Island—in December, 1776 and 
January, 1777, and again in 1781. Other conventions of northeastern 
states met in Springfield, Massachusetts (1777); New Haven, 
Connecticut (1778); Hartford, Connecticut (1779 and 1780); and 
Boston, Massachusetts (1780).60 Conventions that included states 
outside the Northeast included those at York Town, Pennsylvania 
(1777), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (1780 and, of course, 1787), and 
Annapolis, Maryland (1786).61 There also were abortive calls for multi-
state conventions in Fredericksburg, Virginia, Charleston, South 
Carolina, and elsewhere.62 
Thus, the Constitutional Convention of 1787—far from being the 
unique event it is often assumed to be—was but one in a long line of 
similar gatherings. 
B.  Historical Records 
Each convention produced official records referred to as its journal, 
minutes, or proceedings. These records vary widely in length and 
completeness. For example, the journals of the First Continental 
Congress and of the Constitutional Convention consume hundreds of 
pages, but the proceedings of the 1781 Providence Convention cover 
                                                                                                                     
conference between the Indians and Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York, 
and stating accurately that four colonies attended the 1751 meeting in Albany).  
 59. WARD, supra note 1, at 137–38. Maryland and Virginia signed treaties with the 
Indians at this conference, with Pennsylvania serving as a broker. The lieutenant governor of 
Pennsylvania also served as a representative of the colony of Delaware. See FRANKLIN, INDIAN 
TREATIES, supra note 1, at 41.  
60.  See Natelson, First Century, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 61.  See id. 
 62. Infra Part III.K–L. 
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less than a page and a half. Fortunately, a fair amount of other historical 
material supplements the journals. This material includes legislative 
records, other official documents, and personal correspondence. The 
journals and other sources tend to show consistency in convention 
protocol and procedures. 
The Albany Congress, the Stamp Act Congress, the First Continental 
Congress, and the Constitutional Convention have been subjects of 
detailed historical study. The other multi-state conventions have been 
largely neglected.  
C.  Convention Terminology 
Convention practice included certain standard terminology, some of 
which appears in Article V. The convention call was the initial 
invitation to meet. Most calls were issued by individual states or 
colonies. Some were issued by the Continental Congress or by previous 
conventions. 
The usual role of a multi-state convention was as a problem-solving 
task force, so the call necessarily specified the issue or issues to be 
addressed. However, the call never attempted to dictate a particular 
outcome or to limit the convention to answering a prescribed question 
affirmatively or negatively. The call also specified the initial time and 
place of meeting and whether the convention resolutions would bind the 
participating states or serve merely as recommendations or proposals. 
The call did not determine how the colonies or states were to select their 
delegates, nor did it establish convention rules or choose convention 
officers. An invited government was always free to ignore a call.  
A general convention was one to which all or most colonies or states 
were invited, even if limited to a single subject.63 A partial convention 
was one restricted to a certain region, such as New England or the 
Middle States. The terms “general” or “partial” referred only to 
geographic area; they had nothing to do with the scope of the subject 
matter specified by the call. Thus, a convention for proposing 
amendments is a general convention, even if limited to a single 
subject.64 Failure to understand why a convention for proposing 
                                                                                                                     
 63. E.g., A Freeman, NEWPORT HERALD, Apr. 3, 1788, reprinted in 24 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 220–21 (referring to the Constitutional Convention as “the General 
Convention of the States”). The Philadelphia Price Convention of 1780 was referred to as a 
general convention because all but the three southernmost states were invited. PA. JOURNALS, 
supra note 1, at 396–97 (Nov. 15, 1779). 
 64. E.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 177 (“The proposition for amendments 
may arise from Congress itself, when two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary. If they 
should not, and yet amendments be generally wished for by the people, two thirds of the 
legislatures of the different states may require a general convention for the purpose, in which 
case Congress are under the necessity of convening one. Any amendments which either 
Congress shall propose, or which shall be proposed by such general convention, are afterwards 
15
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amendments is referred to as a general convention has led some writers 
to conclude that it must be unlimited as to topic.65   
A plenipotentiary convention was one whose topic was unlimited. 
The credentials issued to delegates to the First Continental Congress 
were so broad, that it was arguably plenipotentiary.66 The powers of the 
other multi-government conventions ranged from the very broad (the 
Springfield Convention of 1777,67 the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention)68 to the very narrow (e.g., the Providence Convention of 
1781).69 
A committee was a colonial or state delegation—that is, the body 
into which the diplomacy of the colony or state had been committed. 
Thus, an interstate convention, while often referred to by a variant of 
the phrase “convention of the states,”70 also could be called a 
“convention of committees”71 or a “convention of committees of the 
several states.”72 
Each participating colony or state empowered its representatives by 
documents called commissions, sometimes referred to also as 
credentials.73 Although a representative could be referred to informally 
as a “delegate,” the formal title was commissioner.74 Each commission 
                                                                                                                     
to be submitted to the legislatures of the different states, or conventions called for that purpose, 
as Congress shall think proper, and, upon the ratification of three fourths of the states, will 
become a part of the Constitution.” (quoting James Iredell, at the North Carolina ratifying 
convention)) Iredell, a leading lawyer and judge, later served as associate justice on the United 
States Supreme Court.  
 65. E.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 
YALE L.J. 189, 202 (1972).  
 66. Infra Part III.C. 
 67. Infra Part III.F. 
 68. On the broad scope of the powers of most delegates at the Constitutional Convention, 
see infra Part III.N–O. 
 69. Infra Part III.L. 
 70. E.g., A Freeman, NEWPORT HERALD, Apr. 3, 1788, reprinted in 24 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 220; 19 J. CONT. CONG. 235 (Mar. 6, 1781) (referring to the second 
Hartford convention as a “convention of sundry states”). 
 71. E.g., 11 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 843 (Aug. 27, 1778) (referring to the 
Springfield gathering); 15 id. at 1254 (Nov. 10, 1779) (referring to the first Hartford convention 
the same way); id. at 1272 (Nov. 15, 1779) (same); 17 id. at 790 (Aug. 29, 1780) (referring to 
the 1780 Boston Convention); 18 id. at 931–32 (Oct. 16, 1780) (same); id. at 1141 (Dec. 12, 
1780) (referring to the second Hartford convention the same way). 
 72. E.g., 9 id. at 1043 (Dec. 20, 1777) (referring to the prospective New Haven 
convention). 
 73. See generally infra Part III (discussing proceedings at various conventions).  
 74. Hence, such a convention sometimes was called a “convention of commissioners.” 
See, e.g., 15 id. at 1287 (Nov. 18, 1779) (so labeling the first Hartford convention); PA. 
JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 398 (Nov. 18, 1779) (also so labeling the first Hartford Convention).  
16
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specified the topic of the meeting and the scope of authority granted.75 
Instructions might supplement the commission.76 Unlike commissions, 
instructions were not usually reproduced in the convention journal, and 
might be secret.77 A delegate’s commission or instructions could restrict 
his authority to a scope narrower than the scope of the call. For 
example, the commissions issued by New York, Massachusetts, and 
Delaware to their delegates to the Constitutional Convention limited 
their authority to a scope narrower than the call.78 
Like other agents, commissioners were expected to remain within 
the limits of their authority, and ultra vires acts were not legally 
binding.79 However, also like other agents, commissioners could make 
non-binding recommendations to their principals. To put this in modern 
terms: A convention for proposing amendments could recommend that 
Congress or the states consider amendments outside the subject-matter 
assigned to the convention, but those recommendations would be 
legally void—that is, they would not be ratifiable “proposals.” 
Each state determined how to appoint its commissioners, but in 
practice the legislature usually selected them, with chambers in 
bicameral legislatures acting either by joint vote or seriatim.80 If the 
legislature was not in session or had authorized the executive to fill 
vacancies, then selection was by the executive—normally the governor 
and his executive council, but in wartime often by the state’s committee 
of safety.81 Each colony or state paid its own delegates.82  
                                                                                                                     
 75. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 1, at 199 (James Madison) (“The powers of 
the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given 
to the members by their respective constituents.”).  
 76. E.g., 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 574 (reproducing Rhode Island’s instructions 
to its delegates at the 1780 Philadelphia Price Convention); 21 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 
307–08 (reproducing instructions to delegates at the 1780 Philadelphia Price Convention); 
1786–1787 id. at 320 (reproducing instructions to delegates to the Annapolis Convention); id. at 
447–49 (reproducing instructions to delegates to the Constitutional Convention). 
 77. As the Massachusetts instructions set forth supra note 76 undoubtedly were, since 
they quarreled with the purposes of the convention. 
 78. See infra notes 411 & 415 and accompanying text. 
 79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (“There is no 
position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, 
contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void.”); see THOMAS 
BRADBURY CHANDLER, WHAT THINK YE OF THE CONGRESS NOW? 7 (New York, J. Rivington 
1775) (stating that a principal is bound by an agent’s actions within the scope of the 
commission, but not by actions that exceed the scope of the commission). For a summary of 
eighteenth-century fiduciary law, see generally Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special 
Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. 
REV. L. & POL. 239, 251–69 (2007). 
 80. See, e.g., Part III.F (discussing selection of delegates to the 1777 Springfield 
convention).  
 81. See generally Part III; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (“[I]f Vacancies happen by 
Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive 
17
Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
632 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
As observed earlier, the official proceedings of the convention, 
drafted by the convention secretary or clerk, constituted its journal, 
minutes, or proceedings. 
III.  SUMMARY OF CONVENTIONS PRIOR TO THE CONSTITUTION 
This Part III summarizes the central procedures and characteristics 
of the three inter-colonial conventions for which records are most 
complete and all of the interstate conventions for which I have found 
records. This is not intended to be an exhaustive history of these 
meetings. It focuses principally on the protocols and usages employed 
in calling, conducting, and considering the recommendations of inter-
governmental conventions. 
A.  The Albany Congress of 1754 
Of the multi-colonial conventions in Albany during the eighteenth 
century, the gathering between June 19 and July 11, 1754 is by far the 
best documented. It also has been the subject of several scholarly 
studies.83 
Twenty-five delegates from seven colonies participated in the 1754 
Albany Congress. The number of colonies actually was eight if one 
counts Delaware, which had its own legislature but an executive held in 
common with Pennsylvania. Georgia had not been invited; the other 
                                                                                                                     
thereof may make temporary Appointments. . . .”); id. art. IV, § 4 (“[May protect the states from 
domestic violence] on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature 
cannot be convened). . . .”) For the roles of committees of safety (also called “councils of war” 
and “councils of safety”) during “the recess” of Founding-Era state legislatures, see Robert G. 
Natleson, The Origins and Meaning of “Vacancies that May Happen During the Recess” in the 
Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause, 37 HARVARD J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming, 
2014). 
 82. E.g., 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 270–71 (showing payment of delegates to the 
two Hartford Conventions); 20 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 175 (showing payment to 
commissioners to first Hartford Convention); id. at 233 (showing payment to New Haven 
commissioners); id. at 296 (showing payment to commissioners to first Hartford Convention); 
id. at 308 (payment for Philadelphia Price Convention); id. at 387 (same); 1786–1787 id. at 304 
(showing allowance to commissioners to Annapolis Convention); id. at 519 (showing allowance 
to commissioners to Constitutional Convention); 15 PA. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 135 (Minutes 
of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, showing payment to Tench Coxe for service 
in Annapolis); id. at 546 (showing payment to widow of William Henry for service at the 
Philadelphia Price Convention); 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 301 (showing payments to 
delegates to the first Providence and Springfield Conventions); id. at 369 (showing payment to 
New Haven commissioner); 9 id. at 293 (showing payment to commissioner to first Hartford 
Convention). 
 83. See generally, e.g., NEWBOLD, supra note 1; SHANNON, supra note 1; see also Beverly 
McAnear, Notes and Documents, Personal Accounts of the Albany Congress of 1754, 39 MISS. 
VALLEY HIST. REV. 727 (1953); John R. Alden, The Albany Congress and the Creation of the 
Indian Superintendencies, 27 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 193 (1940). The minutes of the Albany 
Congress appear in 6 N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 853–92. 
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colonies had been invited but did not attend. Appendixes A and B list 
the commissioners and the colonies they represented for the Albany 
Congress and for the other (non-abortive) conventions discussed in this 
Article.  
In a few ways the Albany Congress varied from most subsequent 
multi-government gatherings. Because it was called primarily to 
conduct diplomacy with the Six Nations of the Iroquois, it included 
delegates from the Six Nations as well as commissioners from the 
colonies.84 Although the immediate call came from James DeLancey, 
the royal lieutenant governor of New York,85 DeLancey was acting as a 
proxy for the British Lords of Trade.86 Thus, the Albany Congress was 
different from future conventions in that the British government was 
represented. Moreover, as the representative of the Crown,87 DeLancey 
was expected to preside; beginning in 1774, multi-colonial and multi-
state conventions invariably elected their own presiding officers. 
Otherwise, the practices followed before and during the Albany 
Congress were consistent with those of later gatherings. 
First, like the call of most subsequent conventions, the call for the 
Albany Congress was limited rather than plenipotentiary.88 The 
specified topic was improving relations with the Iroquois and signing an 
inter-colonial treaty with them.89 
Second, each participating colony sent “commissioners” empowered 
by “commissions” or “credentials.” An exception was New York, where 
the lieutenant governor and members of the executive council 
comprised that state’s committee. Those delegates needed no 
commissions because their offices granted them sufficient authority.90 
Third, the colonies themselves decided how to select their delegates. 
New York, as noted, sent its executive council. In Pennsylvania the 
lieutenant governor chose the commissioners with the consent of the 
colony’s proprietors.91 In Maryland, the governor made the selection.92 
In the other four colonies, the legislature elected the commissioners.93 
                                                                                                                     
 84. See 6 N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 866. 
 85. DeLancy undertook the task because the royal governor, Sir Danvers Osborne, had 
committed suicide. NEWBOLD, supra note 1, at 23. 
 86. The Lords of Trade letter appears at N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 854–56. 
 87. SHANNON, supra note 1, at 130 (“James DeLancey ironically became the king’s 
mouthpiece at the Albany Congress.”). 
 88. See NEWBOLD, supra note 1, at 47–48. 
 89. 6 N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 856 (quoting letter from Lords of Trade to New 
York governor). 
 90. SHANNON, supra note 1, at 147. 
 91. 2 N.Y. HISTORY, supra note 1, at 549–50. 
 92. Id. at 551. 
 93. The Massachusetts commission recites selection by the General Court (legislature). 2 
N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 545. The New Hampshire commission is not entirely clear, but 
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In subsequent conventions, the legislative election method became 
dominant. 
Fourth, each colony decided how many delegates to send. New 
Hampshire credentialed four commissioners, Massachusetts five, Rhode 
Island two, Connecticut three, New York five, Pennsylvania four, and 
Maryland two.94 By far the best-known today of the delegates was 
Benjamin Franklin, although two others are well known to students of 
the period: Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts was to become the 
royal governor of his colony and perhaps the continent’s most 
prominent Tory. Rhode Island’s Stephen Hopkins would become a 
leading Founder and signer of the Declaration of Independence.95 
Fifth, despite the different size of colonial committees, the weight of 
each colony seems to have been equal. The Albany Congress 
established a precedent followed by all subsequent conventions: “to 
avoid all disputes about the precedency of the Colonies,” they always 
were ordered in the minutes from north to south.96 
Sixth, the Albany Congress kept an official record of its proceedings, 
which it denominated the minutes.97 
Seventh, the gathering elected a non-delegate, Peter Wraxall, as 
secretary (in later conventions sometimes entitled “clerk”), and he was 
put on oath.98 
Finally, the group established its own committees, and elected 
members to staff them.99 
Most of the time at the Albany Congress was consumed by 
negotiations with the Iroquois. At the urging of Franklin, however, the 
gathering also recommended to the colonies and to Parliament a “Plan 
of Union” uniting most of British North America under a single Grand 
Council and President-General. The vote for the Plan at the Albany 
Congress was unanimous, but the scheme became highly controversial. 
Many saw the it as beyond the scope of the Congress’s call, even 
though the language of most of the commissions was broad enough to 
authorize the recommendation.100 Some colonies refused to consider it, 
                                                                                                                     
implies selection of two delegates from each legislative chamber. Id. at 546–47. The 
Connecticut credentials recite selection by the general assembly, id. at 547–48, as do those of 
Rhode Island, id. at 548–49. 
 94. See Newbold, supra note 1, at 45. 
 95. See id. at 42–43.  
 96. 6 N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 859. 
 97. Id. at 853–59.  
 98. Id. at 859. 
 99. Id. at 860. 
 100. The Commissions are located at 2 N.Y. HISTORY, supra note 1, at 545–53, at 47. 
Newbold claims that only the Massachusetts commissioners had such authority, but he reads the 
other commissions far too narrowly. NEWBOLD, supra note 1, at 47. Historian Timothy J. 
Shannon, SHANNON, supra note 1, at 176, is more accurate, but is incorrect when he states that 
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and those that did consider it, rejected it.101 This reception assured that 
the Plan was never introduced in Parliament.102 
B.  The Stamp Act Congress of 1765 
The Stamp Act Congress was held at the instigation of the colonists; 
it was not sponsored by the Crown. The gathering is fairly well 
documented, largely due to C.A. Weslager’s diligent research, and his 
1976 book based on that research.103 
This convention (as in other cases, the word was used 
interchangeably with “congress”)104  was called by the lower house of 
the Massachusetts legislature “to Consult togather [sic] on the present 
Circumstances of the Colonies and the Difficulties to which they are 
and must be reduced by the operation of the late Acts of Parliment 
[sic],” particularly the Stamp Act.105 The call was, therefore, quite broad 
but not plenipotentiary. It asked that the invited colonies send “such 
Committees as the other Houses of Representatives, or Burgesses in the 
Several Colonies on this Continent may think fit to Appoint. . . ”106 The 
call specified the date of meeting (October 1, 1765) and the place (New 
York City). The invitation was not extended to the British colonies in 
Canada or in the Caribbean. 
Nine of the 13 invited colonies sent committees: New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina. The number of 
commissioners on each committee ranged from two to five. There were 
27 in all. Despite the call’s suggestion that the lower house of each 
colony elect commissioners, the colonies used their judgment in the 
matter. Several colonies whose legislatures had been prorogued or 
dissolved chose delegates by other means. In New York, the legislature 
                                                                                                                     
Maryland commissioners were forbidden to discuss a union: they were barred merely from 
committing to one. 2 N.Y. HISTORY, supra note 1, at 552. The Plan of Union was a 
recommendation only. In his subsequent pamphlet advocating the plan, Rhode Island 
commissioner Stephen Hopkins defensively included language from the credentials of four 
colonies that seemed to authorize the Plan, but omitted the Pennsylvania credentials, which were 
more restrictive. STEPHEN HOPKINS, A TRUE REPRESENTATION OF THE PLAN FORMED AT ALBANY, 
FOR UNITING ALL THE BRITISH NORTHERN COLONIES, IN ORDER TO THEIR COMMON SAFETY AND 
DEFENSE 1–3 (Newport, 1755). 
 101. NEWBOLD, supra, note 1, at 169–70. 
 102. Id. at 173. 
 103. WESLAGER, supra note 1.  
 104. On the interchangeability of the two terms to describe meetings of governments, see 
supra notes 44 and 45 and accompanying text. Thus, the word “convention” frequently was 
applied to the Stamp Act Congress. See, e.g., WESLAGER, supra note 1, at 62 (referring to the 
meeting as a convention) & id. at 89 (quoting Thomas Whately as referring to it as a 
convention); 116 (citing attack on the meeting as an “illegal convention”).  
 105. The call is reproduced id. at 181–82.  
 106. Id.  
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previously had designed five New York City lawmakers as a committee 
of correspondence; after informal consultation with their colleagues, 
that committee decided to act as the delegation.107 In Delaware, out-of-
session lawmakers chose the commissioners.108 The convention seated 
delegates even if their selection was not in accord with the mode 
suggested by the call. 
The commissioners included Oliver Partridge of Massachusetts, who 
had served at the 1754 gathering in Albany, and a number of other 
members destined to become “old convention hands.”109  Eliphat Dyer 
of Connecticut, for example, served in four subsequent Founding Era 
conventions.110 The roster also included three men who performed 
distinguished service at the 1787 Constitutional Convention: John 
Dickinson of Pennsylvania (who represented Delaware in Philadelphia), 
William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, and John Rutledge of South 
Carolina.111 The gathering was late getting started, but finally convened 
on October 7.  
The protocols and procedures followed in organizing and operating 
the Stamp Act Congress foreshadowed those of all subsequent 
gatherings of the type. As we have seen, the call was a sparse document, 
limited to date, place and subject. Although unlike most subsequent 
convention calls, it suggested how delegates might be appointed, the 
colonies did not find this suggestion binding and the convention seated 
each colony’s delegates however selected.112 Each colony paid its own 
committee,113 and issued credentials and instructions.114 Some of these 
authorized their delegates only to consult,115  while the rest empowered 
them to join in any proposed course of action. 
The convention adopted its own rules and chose its own 
committees.116 It selected a commissioner, Timothy Ruggles of 
Massachusetts, as President,117 and a non-commissioner, John Cotton, 
as Secretary.118  It elected those two gentlemen by ballot, but then 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 80–81.  
 108. Id. at 93–95. Such was also the case in South Carolina, id. at 148. 
 109. For a list of all commissioners, see id. at 255.  
 110. See Appendix A.  
 111. Id.; WESLAGER, supra note 1, at 255.  
 112. WESLAGER, supra note 1, at 198 (reproducing portion of journal reporting seating of 
irregularly-selected delegates).  
 113. See, e.g., id. at 62 (Massachusetts), 69 (Connecticut), 73 (Maryland), 85 
(Pennsylvania).  
 114. The credentials are reproduced id. at 183–97; for an example of instructions, see id. at 
88 (Rhode Island).  
 115. These included Connecticut, id. at 69 and South Carolina. Id. at 148.  
 116. Id. at 124 (discussing election of committee to inspect minutes and proceedings).  
 117. Id. at 122. 
 118. Id. at 123.  
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reverted to the rule of one colony/one vote.119 It also kept a journal.120  
The convention adjourned on October 25 after issuing four documents: 
A declaration of the rights of the colonists, an address to the king, a 
memorial to the House of Lords, and a petition to the House of 
Commons.121 
C.  The Continental Congress of 1774 
The call for a continental congress or convention came from the 
New York Committee of Correspondence in a circular letter authored 
by John Jay.122 The gathering was a general rather than a partial 
convention, since all the colonies were invited.123 
The Congress met in Philadelphia on September 5, 1774 and 
adjourned on October 26 of the same year. Fifty-six commissioners 
from twelve of the thirteen continental colonies south of Canada 
attended; Georgia was absent. (See Appendices A and B.) The journal 
of the proceedings is extensive, and of course the history of the 
Congress has inspired a massive amount of retelling. The task here is 
not to recite that history, but to identify key protocols and procedures. 
In most colonies, commissioners were chosen by the de facto 
legislative authority. In Rhode Island, the de jure legislature also 
governed de facto, so it named that colony’s commissioners. In other 
colonies, royal officials and upper-house councilors had become 
recalcitrant, so commissioners were selected either by the lower house 
(as in Massachusetts or Pennsylvania) or by colonial conventions acting 
as legislatures (New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North 
Carolina). In Connecticut, the lower house empowered the committee of 
correspondence to appoint the commissioners. In New York, voters 
elected them directly in local meetings.124 
In its scope, the First Continental Congress was perhaps the most 
nearly plenipotentiary of multi-colonial and multi-state conventions. 
Colony-issued credentials granted very broad authority to consult and 
recommend solutions to the crisis with Great Britain. The narrowest 
credentials, those issued by Rhode Island, empowered that colony’s 
                                                                                                                     
 119. Id. at 124–25 (discussing the one colony/one vote decision).  
 120. The journal is reproduced id. at 181–218.  
 121. These documents are reproduced in the journal.  
 122. The text of the letter is reproduced at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/letter_ 
ny_comm_1774.asp (last accessed Mar. 12, 2013). For an account, see Edward D. Collins, 
Committees of Correspondence of the American Revolution 262 (1901).  
 123. The New York invitation stated that the gathering should be a “congress of deputies 
from the colonies in general. . .” See http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/letter_ny_comm_ 
1774.asp (last accessed Mar. 12, 2013).  
 124. The credentials of delegates from attending states other than North Carolina are 
reproduced at 1 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 15–24. Those for North Carolina are 
reproduced at id. at 30.  
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delegates 
to meet and join with the commissioners or delegates from 
the other colonies, in consulting upon proper measures to 
obtain a repeal of the several acts of the British parliament, 
for levying taxes upon his Majesty’s subjects in America, 
without their consent, and particularly an act lately passed 
for blocking up the port of Boston, and upon proper 
measures to establish the rights and liberties of the 
Colonies, upon a just and solid foundation, agreeable to the 
instructions given you by the general Assembly.125 
The other credentials were wider still, for they not only authorized 
almost unlimited discussion, but also conveyed authority to bind their 
respective colonies to collective decisions. For example, the Delaware 
commissions empowered delegates “to consult and advise [i.e., 
deliberate] with the deputies from the other colonies, and to determine 
upon all such prudent and lawful measures, as may be judged most 
expedient for the Colonies immediately and unitedly to adopt. . . .”126 
Pennsylvania bestowed authority “to form and adopt a plan for the 
purposes of obtaining redress of American grievances,”127 and New 
Jersey used the general formula, “to represent the Colony of New Jersey 
in the said general congress.”128 Thus, Rhode Island had in mind a 
proposing convention, but the other colonies sought one that actually 
could decide matters. When a commissioner had authority to bind his 
government, international lawyers said he had power to pledge the faith 
of his government.129 Variants on “pledge the faith” appear in the 
proceedings of several later multi-state conventions.130 
Ultimately, however, the First Continental Congress made no 
decisions legally binding on the colonies. It merely issued a series of 
recommendations and petitions, memorials and other communications. 
Thus, it remained within the scope of power authorized by the 
narrowest credentials. 
As the Stamp Act Congress had done,131 the First Continental 
Congress elected all its own officers and staffed all its own committees. 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Cf. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. 2, §§ 163, 220, 329.4 (Liberty Fund 
ed., 2008) (1758) (discussing the faith of treaties); id. bk. 2, § 225 (discussing the pledge of faith 
in an oath); id. bk. 2, § 234 (discussing tacit pledges of faith), bk. 3, § 238 (discussing the 
pledge of faith in truces and suspensions of arms).  
 130. This is most notable in the commissions issued for the Philadelphia Price Convention. 
Infra notes 261–63 and accompanying text. 
 131. Supra Part III.B.  
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At the first session, the gathering elected Peyton Randolph, a delegate 
from Virginia, as president, and Charles Thompson, a non-delegate, as 
secretary.132 The following day, the convention set about adopting rules. 
The first of these was the principle of suffrage: 
     Resolved, That in determining questions in this 
Congress, each Colony or Province shall have one Vote.—
The Congress not being possess’d of, or at present able to 
procure proper materials for ascertaining the importance of 
each Colony.133 [The session then adopted the following 
additional rules.] 
     Resolved, That no person shall speak more than twice on 
the same point, without the leave of the Congress. 
     Resolved, That no question shall be determined the day, 
on which it is agitated and debated, if any one of the 
Colonies desire the determination to be postponed to 
another day. 
     Resolved, That the doors be kept shut during the time of 
business, and that the members consider themselves under 
the strongest obligations of honour, to keep the proceedings 
secret, untill [sic] the majority shall direct them to be made 
public. 
     Resolved, unan: That a Committee be appointed to State 
the rights of the Colonies in general, the several instances 
in which these rights are violated or infringed, and the 
means most proper to be pursued for obtaining a restoration 
of them. . . . 
     Resolved, That the Rev.d Mr. Duché be desired to open 
the Congress tomorrow morning with prayers, at the 
Carpenter’s Hall, at 9 o’Clock.134 
These rules were adopted by the Second Continental Congress as 
well.135 
Before adjournment, the Congress issued a conditional call for a 
second congress to meet on May 10, 1775, “unless the redress of 
grievances, which we have desired, be obtained before that time.”136 
The body then dissolved itself.137 
 
                                                                                                                     
 132. 1 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 14. 
 133. Id. at 25. 
 134. Id. at 26. 
 135. 2 id. at 55. 
 136. 1 id. at 102. 
 137. Id. at 114. 
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D.  The Providence Convention of 1776–1777 
The first multi-government convention after Independence was that 
held from December 25, 1776 to January 2, 1777 in Providence, Rhode 
Island. 
On November 16, 1776, the Massachusetts House of Representatives 
passed, and the council approved, a resolution that served both as the 
call and as the appointment of delegates. It specified as subjects paper 
currency and public credit. The convention was to confer on those 
subjects and make proposals to the legislatures sending them, as well as 
to Congress.138 The power of the Massachusetts delegation to 
communicate proposals to other states and to Congress was conditional 
on agreement by the committees of the other states. The resolution 
appointed Tristram Dalton and Azor Orne as “a Committee to meet 
Committees from the General Assemblies of the States of Connecticut, 
New-Hampshire and Rhode-Island, at Providence in Rhode-Island the 
tenth day of December next. . . .”139 
On November 21, the Rhode Island general assembly accepted the 
call and appointed its own committee.140 Just four days later, 
Connecticut rejected the call. In a letter to Massachusetts Council 
president James Bowdoin, Connecticut Governor Jonathan Trumbull 
explained that “[I] am desired by the Assembly of this State to advise” 
that such a convention might “give umbrage to the other States” because 
Congress previously had “taken the subject into consideration.” 
Trumbull added that Connecticut already had laws dealing with 
                                                                                                                     
 138. The Massachusetts resolution stated: 
Resolved, That the Honourable Tristram Dalton and Aaron Orne, Esquires, 
with such as the honourable Board shall join, be a Committee to meet 
Committees from the General Assemblies of the States of Connecticut, New-
Hampshire, and Rhode-Island, at Providence, in Rhode-Island, the tenth day of 
December next, provided said Assemblies think proper to appoint such 
Committees, then and there to hold a conference respecting further emissions of 
Paper Currency on the credit of any of said States; also on measures necessary 
for supporting the credit of the publick [sic] Currencies thereof: And the said 
Committee (if the Committees of the other States so met agree thereto) be 
empowered to communicate to the other United States of America the intention 
of their Convention, and urge that some measures be taken by them to the same 
purpose, and to give like information to the honourable the Continental 
Congress, and propose to them whether the regulation of the Currencies is not 
an object of necessary attention, and to report as soon as may be. 
And it is Ordered, That the Secretary immediately transmit authenticated 
copies of the Resolve to the General Assemblies of the several States 
aforementioned. 
3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 772. 
 139. 19 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 661. 
 140. 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
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currency and credit issues.141 
Initially, the Massachusetts Council voted to proceed with the 
convention “the foregoing letter notwithstanding,”142 but the House was 
opposed. With the ultimate concurrence of the Council, the legislature 
wrote to New Hampshire and Rhode Island informing them the 
gathering was canceled.143 President Bowdoin expressed the belief, 
however, that “this matter will be taken up again.”144 
Bowdoin turned out to be right. On December 6 (the same day the 
Massachusetts legislature decided not to pursue the convention) Rhode 
Island’s Governor Nicholas Cooke, surveying the military situation, 
wrote to Bowden that Rhode Island would “readily concur in proper 
measures with the Assemblies of the States of Massachusetts-Bay and 
Connecticut.”145 Just three days after that, Trumbell sent a missive to 
Massachusetts bemoaning the sad state of the American cause. He 
added: 
When we had an intimation from you a few weeks past 
for Commissioners from the New-England States to meet at 
Providence, to confer on the affair of our currency, it was 
then thought, for prudential reasons given you in answer 
then, to decline; but I beg leave to suggest whether, in the 
present aspect of affairs, our main army drove to the 
southward, the communication being greatly interrupted 
and in danger of being totally obstructed between the 
Southern and New-England Colonies, whether it will not be 
best, as soon as the enemy are retired into winter quarters, 
for the New-England States to meet by their 
Commissioners to consult on the great affairs of our safety, 
and of counteracting the enemy in their future 
operations. . . . We hope we shall soon hear from you on 
this subject.146 
With the Massachusetts House then in recess, the Council, through 
Bowdoin, responded warmly. Bowdoin assured Trumbull that 
                                                                                                                     
 141. Letter from Jonathan Trumbull to James Bowdoin (Nov. 25, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN 
ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 845. Trumbull further explained the decision in a letter to Governor 
Cooke of Rhode Island. Letter from Governor Trumbull to Governour Cooke (Dec. 4, 1776), in 
3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1077. 
 142. 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 845–46 (Dec. 6, 1776). 
 143. Id. at 846. 
 144. James Bowdoin to President Weare (President of the Council of New Hampshire), 
Dec. 6, 1776, reprinted in 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1104–05. 
 145. Letter from Governor Cooke to James Bowdoin (Dec. 6, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN 
ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1104. 
 146. Letter from Governor Trumbull to Mass. Council (Dec. 9, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN 
ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1142–43. 
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Massachusetts was still willing to participate, and that the authority of 
the Bay State delegates would be expanded to include military affairs: 
The regulation of the price of things, (the mode you have 
adopted,) was thought of, and might have been the best, but 
many objections arose, which at that time prevented it. 
However, as we have renewed our application to you to 
join with the other States of New-England in the appointing 
a Committee to consider this and other matters, we hope 
you will approve the measure, and that great good will 
result from it. By our proposal their commission is to be so 
extensive as to include the important business you mention 
of consulting on the great affairs of our safety, and 
counteracting the enemy in their future operations. But if 
this is not expressed in terms sufficiently explicit, you can 
agree to our proposal with such additions as you think 
proper, and there is no doubt we shall concur with you.147 
After that communication, all the invited states acted quickly. On 
December 18, for example, Massachusetts delegate Tristram Dalton 
acknowledged receiving his orders,148 and on the same day the 
Connecticut legislature appointed its delegates and defined their 
authority.149 The committees had gathered in Providence by Christmas 
Day. 
Thirteen delegates represented the four states: four from Connecticut 
and three each from Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts 
(which had added Thomas Cushing to its committee).150 All had been 
appointed by their respective legislatures, except for the Rhode Island 
commissioners. The British had occupied much of that state, so the 
legislature had deputized a council of war to exercise its powers. The 
council of war appointed its commissioners, two of whom were 
members of the council itself.151 
The states had granted their delegates authority that, while not 
unlimited, was quite broad. As promised, Massachusetts had expanded 
the power conferred on its committee to include military as well as 
                                                                                                                     
 147. Letter from Massachusetts Council to Governor Trumbull (Dec. 13, 1776), in 3 
AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1209–10. 
 148. Letter from Tristram Dalton to John Avery (Dec. 18, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN 
ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1287. 
 149. 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1389. 
 150. For the delegates, see Appendices A and B. One delegate, a man from New 
Hampshire, rejoiced in the name of Supply Clap. Apparently he was a competent fellow. See 
Letter from John Langdon to Josiah Bartlett (June 3, 1776), in BARTLETT PAPERS, supra note 1, 
at 67, 68 n.2. 
 151. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 585, 588. 
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economic measures, with the proviso that they avoid subjects 
“repugnant to or interfering with the powers and authorities of the 
Continental Congress.”152 Connecticut granted authority to address 
public credit and “every measure . . . necessary for the common 
defense.”153 The authority of the Rhode Island committee was 
similar.154 Only New Hampshire issued narrower credentials, which 
encompassed military matters but did not mention currency or public 
credit.155 
However, a key reason for the decision to address currency and 
public credit was the need to keep armies in the field. Accordingly, the 
New Hampshire delegates finally concluded that commissions were 
broad enough to include them. As Josiah Bartlett, one of those delegates 
explained: 
I am fully sensible of the difficulties attending the setting 
prices to any thing, much more to every thing, but unless 
something was done so as the soldier might be ascertained 
of what he could purchase for his forty shillings, no more 
would enlist, nor could we with reason expect it: what will 
be the effect of establishing prices I know not, however it 
must be tried . . . .156 
The call had been for a convention that would make proposals only, 
without authority to “pledge the faith” of the participating governments. 
This limitation, reflected in a letter from the Rhode Island’s Stephen 
Hopkins, the first president of the convention, to the Massachusetts 
council,157 also appeared in the credentials and in the proceedings: The 
latter repeatedly referred to convention resolutions as “representations” 
or “applications” (in a precatory sense).158 
The convention elected its own officers, initially choosing Hopkins 
as president.159 When Hopkins left midway through the proceedings, the 
convention replaced him with William Bradford, also from Rhode 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Id. at 585, 586. 
 153. Id. at 587. 
 154. Id. at 588. 
 155. Id. at 587.  
 156. Letter from Josiah Bartlett to William Whipple (Jan. 15, 1777), in BARTLETT PAPERS, 
supra note 1, at 143–44; see also 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 585, 592 (a convention 
resolution expressing the view that “exhorbitant [sic] price[s] of every necessary and convention 
article of life . . . disheartens and disaffects the soldiers.”).  
 157. Letter from Stephen Hopkins to James Bowdoin, 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 
1, at 1423 (stating in part, “we . . . are of opinion” and “We submit this representation, and 
desire you would give orders”). 
 158. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 585, 589. 
 159. Id. at 589. 
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Island.160 As clerk, the delegates selected Rowse J. Helme, a non-
delegate.161 
The Providence Convention of 1776–1777 issued a wide range of 
recommendations, covering prices, auctions, and an embargo of luxury 
goods.162 Its final proposal—a “Day of Fasting, Public Humiliation, and 
Prayer”163—would in those religious times and in religious New 
England certainly, be seen as within the delegates’ respective powers. 
On January 2, 1777, the group adjourned sine die.164 The convention’s 
recommendations were taken seriously, and later in the year, 
Massachusetts and Connecticut both sent troops to Rhode Island in 
accordance with them.165 
E.  The York Town and Abortive Charleston Price Conventions of 1777 
When the Continental Congress received letters from Connecticut 
and Massachusetts describing the Providence recommendations, 
Congress scheduled the matter for discussion.166 That discussion spread 
over several days in late January and the first half of February, 1777.167 
Some congressional delegates questioned whether the meeting of the 
New England states had been proper, in view of the power vested in 
Congress. Those delegates were in the minority, however; 
contemporaneous reports relate that Congress in general was quite 
pleased with the recommendations, particularly those pertaining to 
prices.168 
                                                                                                                     
 160. Id. at 592. 
 161. Id. at 589. 
 162. See id. at 589–99. For the embargo recommendation, see id. at 597. 
 163. Id. at 598–99. 
 164. Id. at 589.  
 165. Id. at 161; 19 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 732–33. 
 166. 7 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 65–66 (referring to receipt of the letters and 
scheduling of discussion on Jan. 28, 1777). 
 167. 7 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 79, 80–81 (Jan. 31, 1777); id. at 85, 87–88 (Feb. 4, 
1777); id. at 88, 93–94 (Feb. 5, 1777); id. at 94, 97 (Feb. 6, 1777); id. at 108, 111–12 (Feb. 12, 
1777); id. at 112, 118 (Feb. 13, 1777); id. at 118, 121–22 (Feb. 14, 1777); id. at 123, 124–25 
(Feb. 15, 1777). 
 168. 7 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 88 (committee of the whole report, Feb. 4, 1777); 
id. at 118, 121–22 n.4 (Feb. 14, 1777); id. at 123, 124–25 (Feb. 15, 1777); see also Letter of the 
Massachusetts Delegates to the President of the Massachusetts Council (Jan. 31, 1777), 196 
MASSACHUSETTS ARCHIVES 183, reprinted in 2 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 228–29 (“[A] similar 
Mode for giving Stability to the Currency will probably be recommended to the Southern and 
middle Departments of the Continent.”); Letter from Samuel Adams to James Warren (Feb. 1, 
1777), in 2 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 233 (stating that the Providence resolutions “are much 
applauded as being wise and salutary”); Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Feb. 7, 
1777), reprinted in 2 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 237 (“The attempt of New England to regulate 
prices is extremely popular in Congress, who will recommend an imitation of it to the other 
States.”); Letter from Abraham Clark to the Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly (Feb. 8, 
30
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1
2013] THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS” 645 
 
On February 15, Congress formally approved the military and 
economic recommendations of the Providence Convention, “except that 
part which recommends the striking bills bearing interest.”169 Congress 
resolved further: 
That the plan for regulating the price of labour, of 
manufactures and of internal produce within those states, 
and of goods imported from foreign parts, except military 
stores, be referred to the consideration of the other [U]nited 
States: and that it be recommended to them, to adopt such 
measures, as they shall think most expedient to remedy the 
evils occasioned by the present fluctuating and exorbitant 
prices of the articles aforesaid[.]170 
Congress then proceeded to call two additional conventions, both of 
the “proposing” or recommendatory kind: 
That, for this purpose, it be recommended to the 
legislatures, or, in their recess, to the executive powers of 
the States of New York, New Jersey, Pensylvania [sic], 
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, to appoint 
commissioners to meet at York town, in Pensylvania, on 
the 3d Monday in March next, to consider of, and form a 
system of regulation adapted to those States, to be laid 
before the respective legislatures of each State, for their 
approbation: 
That, for the like purpose, it be recommended to the 
legislatures, or executive powers in the recess of the 
legislatures of the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Georgia, to appoint commissioners to meet at 
Charlestown [sic], in South Carolina, on the first Monday 
in May next[.]171 
The Charleston convention apparently was never held.172 One likely 
reason was the objection by North Carolina that Virginia, the economic 
powerhouse of the region, had been grouped with the middle rather than 
                                                                                                                     
1777), in 2 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 242 (reporting that congressional approbation is expected); 
Rush, Notes, supra note 1, at 131–39. 
 169. 7 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 124 (Feb. 15, 1777). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 124–25 (Feb. 15, 1777). 
 172. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 17. South Carolina legislative records from the time are lost, 
and Georgia records are spotty, but my investigation and those of two experienced state 
archivists makes this conclusion probable. 
31
Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
646 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
the southern states.173 However, eighteen commissioners from New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia had 
convened in York Town by March 26.174 The committees from each 
state ranged in size from two commissioners to five.175 The convention 
minutes do not reproduce their credentials. I have been able to find only 
the authority of the Virginia delegates, which was much the same as 
called for by Congress. After reciting the fact of the call, the Virginia 
executive council (acting presumably during a legislative recess) 
authorized its delegates to discuss “regulating the prices of 
Commodities within those States respectively, and of Goods imported 
in the same.”176 
The York Town Price Convention elected Lewis Burwell, a Virginia 
commissioner, as chairman, and Thomas Annor, a non-commissioner, 
as clerk.177 Like other gatherings of the type, the convention appointed 
committees,178 particularly a ways-and-means committee, to 
recommend a scheme of price controls for the consideration of the 
entire assembly.179 
The York Town minutes reveal that the delegates fully understood 
that their role was only to propose to state legislatures, not to decide.180 
Yet they could not agree on a proposal. When the ways-and-means 
committee issued its report, the states split evenly on a motion to reject 
it.181 A motion to amend the plan was voted down five states to one.182 
                                                                                                                     
 173. 2 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 253–54, 257–58; 7 J. CONT. CONG. 121–22 n.4 (reporting 
objections of Thomas Burke, delegate from North Carolina, to placing Virginia in convention of 
middle states). 
 174. The York Town minutes have been hard to locate; even archivists in Pennsylvania and 
in York were unaware that such a convention ever met. They can be found, however, in N.J. 
SELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 34–45 (1848). 
 175. Id. at 35.  
 176. The authorization of Virginia read as follows: 
This Board, taking under their Consideration the Resolutions of Congress, 
bearing date the 15th of [F]ebruary last, respecting the appointment of 
Commissioners from this State, to meet Commissioners of several other States 
at York Town in Pensylvania [sic] for regulating the prices of Commodities 
within those States respectively, and of Goods imported in the same, do appoint 
Lewis Burwell, and Thomas Adams esquires, commissioners for the purposes 
aforesaid on Behalf of this State. 
1 JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 359 (H, R, McIlwain ed., 1931) (Mar. 4, 
1777). 
 177. N.J. SELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
 178. Id. at 36, 38. 
 179. Id. at 36–37. 
 180. See id. at 40–42 (reproducing a proposed resolution to recommend various measures 
to state legislatures). 
 181. On April 1, 1777, the record stated as follows: 
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The deadlock appears to have been brought on, at least in part, because 
many delegates did not believe price controls to be wise or effective 
public policy.183 Accordingly, the convention voted on April 3 to send 
copies of its proceedings to Congress and to the legislatures of the 
participating states—and thereupon to dissolve.184 
F.  The Springfield Convention of 1777 
On June 27, 1777, the Massachusetts legislature called for a 
convention of “Committees from the General Assemblies” of the New 
England states and New York.185 The legislature disseminated the call 
in a circular letter sent to the other four states.186 The designated 
location was Springfield, Massachusetts.187 The subject matter was 
expansive, encompassing paper money, laws to prevent monopoly and 
economic oppression, interstate trade barriers, and “such other matters 
as particularly [c]oncern the immediate [w]elfare” of the participating 
states.188 But it was limited by the stipulation that the convention 
confine itself to matters “not repugnant to or interfering with the powers 
and authorities of the Continental Congress.”189 
Like the York Town and Providence gatherings, this was to be only 
a proposal convention. The call asked that the delegates “consider” 
measures and “report the result of their conference to the General 
Courts [legislatures] of their respective States.”190 The convention’s 
                                                                                                                     
A motion was made and seconded, that the report be rejected, and the 
question being put it was received in the negative, in the manner following: viz: 
For the affirmative, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland. 
For the negative, New York, New Jersey, Virginia.  
Id. at 43. 
 182. Id. at 44. 
 183. Id. at 45. 
 184. Id. The exhaustion of the delegates is captured by the presiding officer’s certification 
line on the resolution to adjourn: “LEWIS BURWELL, Chairman. Signed Thursday evening, 
By candle-light, April 3, 1777.” Id. 
 185. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 601. 
 186. E.g., Letter from Jeremiah Powell to Nicholas Cooke, Governor of Rhode Island (July 
2, 1777), in 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 280 (containing call). 
 187. 20 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 49–50; see also 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, 
at 601 (reproducing Massachusetts resolution); id. at 602 (reproducing New York resolution 
reciting Massachusetts call). 
 188. 20 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 49–50. 
 189. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 599; 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 276 (reciting 
and accepting the call); id. at 278 (appointing committee). 
 190. See 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 599. 
33
Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
648 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
resolutions are consistent with that limitation.191 
On July 30, eleven commissioners from all five states had 
appeared.192 They included, among others, New York’s John Sloss 
Hobart, who had attended at York Town, and several Providence 
veterans: Titus Hosmer of Connecticut, Thomas Cushing of 
Massachusetts, Josiah Bartlett of New Hampshire, and William 
Bradford and Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island.193 Their credentials 
mostly tracked the language of the call or, in the case of New York, 
referred to the call when defining the scope of authority.194 State 
officials were learning that uniformity is important when credentialing. 
The mode of selection varied by state. A joint session of the 
legislature had elected New Hampshire’s and Rhode Island’s 
committees.195 In Massachusetts the legislature had chosen its 
committee by the two chambers voting seriatim.196 In New York, the 
council of safety selected the delegates, and in Connecticut the governor 
and council of safety.197 
As the Providence Convention had done, the Springfield gathering 
elected Stephen Hopkins as President. It chose William Pynchon, Sr., a 
non-commissioner, as clerk.198 
It is a shame that more historical work has not been done on the 
Springfield Convention,199 for it turned out to be an important and 
productive assembly. It met only from July 30 through August 5, but 
produced a series of significant recommendations on a range of 
economic and military subjects.200 The day after adjournment, President 
Hopkins submitted the convention proposals to “the Honorable 
Congress, that such measures may be taken for that end as they in their 
great wisdom shall think proper.”201 These recommendations formed the 
basis for extensive congressional debate and further recommendations 
                                                                                                                     
 191. E.g., id. at 603 (resolving “[t]hat it be earnestly recommended” and, again, “[t]hat it be 
recommended”); id. at 604 (resolving “[t]hat it be recommended”); id. at 605 (resolving,“as the 
opinion of this Committee”). 
 192. Id. at 600.  
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 600–02. The Connecticut commissions initially omitted the exception in favor of 
the power of Congress, but then seemed to limit its delegates’ authority to the items in the call. 
Id. at 601–02. 
 195. See id. at 600, 602. 
 196. See id. at 601. 
 197. Id. at 601, 602. 
 198. Id. at 605. 
 199. For example, Scott, supra note 1, which discusses the other New England conventions 
dealing with prices, fails to mention Springfield. 
 200. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 605.  
 201. Id. at 605–06. Hopkins’ letter was read in Congress on August 18. 8 J. CONT. CONG., 
supra note 1, at 649–50. 
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to the states,202 although not all recommendations were effectuated.203 
G.  The New Haven Price Convention of 1778 (and the Abortive 
Meetings in Charleston and Fredericksburg) 
On November 22, 1777, as part of continuing efforts to curb price 
inflation, the Continental Congress issued calls for three separate multi-
state conventions.204 Congress requested that the eight northernmost 
states meet at New Haven, Connecticut on January 15, 1778; that 
                                                                                                                     
 202. 8 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 727, 731 (voting on September 10, 1777 to add five 
members to committee to consider Springfield recommendations). For further response, see 9 id. 
at 948, 953–58 (Nov. 22, 1777); id. at 967–970 (Nov. 26, 1777); id. at 970–971 (Nov. 27, 1777); 
id. at 985 (Dec. 2, 1777); id. at 988–89 (Dec. 3, 1777); 10 id. at 43, 46 (Jan. 13, 1778); 11 id. at 
758–60 (Aug. 7, 1778); 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 286 (appointing legislative committee 
to encapsulate military supply recommendations in a bill). 
 203. Letter from William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island to Jonathan Trumbull, 
Governor of Connecticut (May 16, 1778), in 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 424 (complaining 
that Rhode Island had not received the troops promised from other states); Letter from William 
Greene, Governor of Rhode Island to the Council of Massachusetts (May 31, 1778), in 8 R.I. 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 425 (same); Letter from Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of 
Connecticut, to William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island (Jun. 5, 1778), in 8 R.I. RECORDS, 
supra note 1, at 443 (excusing failure to meet Connecticut quota); see 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra 
note 1, at 519–20 (representing to Congress the difficulty this failure has inflicted on Rhode 
Island); Letter from Nicholas Cooke, Governor of Rhode Island, to General Sullivan (Mar. 30, 
1778), in 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 526–27 (outlining same problems). 
 204. See 9 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 948, 955–57. The November 22 resolution 
stated: 
Resolved, That it be recommended to the legislatures, or, in their recess, to 
the executive power of the respective states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts 
bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pensylvania [sic], and Delaware, respectively, to appoint commissioners 
to convene at New Haven, in Connecticut, on the 15 day of January next; and 
to the states of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina, respectively, to appoint 
commissioners to convene at Fredericksburg, in Virginia, on the said 15 day of 
January; and to the states of South Carolina and Georgia, respectively, to 
appoint commissioners to convene at Charleston, on the 15 day of February 
next; in order to regulate and ascertain the price of labour, manufactures, 
internal produce, and commodities imported from foreign parts, military stores 
excepted; and also to regulate the charges of inn-holders; and that, on the report 
of the commissioners, each of the respective legislatures enact suitable laws, as 
well for enforcing the observance of such of the regulations as they shall ratify, 
and enabling such inn-holders to obtain the necessary supplies, as to authorize 
the purchasing commissaries for the army, or any other person whom the 
legislature may think proper, to take from any engrossers, forestallers, or other 
person possessed of a larger quantity of any such commodities or provisions 
than shall be competent for the private annual consumption of their families, 
and who shall refuse to sell the surplus at the prices to be ascertained as 
aforesaid, paying only such price for the same. 
Id. at 956–57 (footnote omitted). 
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Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina convene at Fredericksburg, 
Virginia on the same day; and that South Carolina and Georgia gather 
on February 15 at Charleston. I have found no evidence the latter two 
conventions ever met.205 
The call specified as the convention subject-matter developing a 
comprehensive schedule of price controls for non-military products, 
developing enforcement mechanisms, and empowering authorities to 
seize goods from engrossers (hoarders). The call further provided that 
state legislatures should adopt laws to implement “such of the 
regulations as they shall ratify.”206 The precatory nature of that language 
communicated that these gatherings, too, were to be merely agencies to 
propose. 
Like the York Town and Springfield meetings, the New Haven 
Convention has received little scholarly attention.207 One reason may be 
that its journal was so thin.208 Yet the gathering at New Haven was one 
of the better-attended meetings of the kind. It was comprised of 
committees from seven states: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. 
Delaware had been invited but did not send delegates. 
The states had named 21 commissioners, but one from New Jersey 
and two from Pennsylvania failed to attend. By January 15, three 
committees had arrived; six days later, all seven were on hand.209 
Except for the New York committee, all had been elected by their state 
legislatures,210 with bicameral legislatures (Pennsylvania’s was 
unicameral) voting either jointly or by chambers seriatim. The New 
York committee was appointed by the state convention, a body that 
served as the legislature when the regular legislature was in recess or 
disrupted by the British.211  
The convention elected Thomas Cushing of Massachusetts, a veteran 
of both the First Continental Congress and of Providence and 
                                                                                                                     
 205. Accord CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 18.  
 206. 9 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 957. 
 207. The principal treatment, Baldwin, supra note 1, is a sketchy and unsatisfying account 
that spends much of its time on other events and gets some facts wrong (for example, claiming 
that New Jersey delegate John Neilson was subsequently a delegate at the Constitutional 
Convention). Id. at 46. This work is sometimes referred to by the consecutive titles of its first 
two papers: “The New Haven Convention of 1778; The Boundary Line between Connecticut 
and New York.” 
 208. See generally 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 607–20. 
 209. Id. at 610–11 (reporting that “[t]he Commissioners arrived from the State of 
Pennsylvania” on that date). 
 210. The credentials stated how the committees were selected. Id. at 607–11; see also 8 R.I. 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 340 (reproducing Rhode Island’s acceptance of the congressional 
call, and election of the commissioners by a joint ballot of both houses of the general assembly). 
 211. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 609–10 (setting forth resolution of New York 
convention).  
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Springfield, as its president. It chose Henry Daggett, a non-delegate, as 
secretary.212 Besides Cushing, four other commissioners had convention 
experience. William Floyd of New York had attended the First 
Continental Congress. Robert Treat Paine of Massachusetts had been at 
that Congress and at Springfield, as had Connecticut’s Roger Sherman. 
Nathaniel Peabody of New Hampshire also had represented his state at 
Springfield.213 
On January 22, 1778, the New Haven convention adopted rules of 
conduct. The content of those rules does not appear in the journal, 
except the rule of suffrage: each state had one vote.214 Like other such 
assemblies, the convention appointed its own committees.215 
The official journal tells us little of the proceedings. It does 
reproduce the lengthy text of the principal resolution,216 which in 
accordance with the call is purely recommendatory.217 The journal 
likewise includes a formal letter to Congress,218 a letter to the absent 
state of Delaware,219 and a recommendation that states write circular 
letters to other states assuring them that the senders had stopped issuing 
paper money and were honoring congressional requisitions.220 
The New Haven convention also exercised its prerogative not to 
propose. For reasons it explained, the convention refused to list 
maximum prices for certain items listed in the congressional call.221 
The gathering apparently adjourned on February 1.222 Congress 
received its recommendations on February 16.223 The convention 
proposals were the subject of later congressional debate and some 
implementation,224 and four states enacted its wage-price schedule into 
                                                                                                                     
 212. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 607. 
 213. See Appendix A. 
 214. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 611. 
 215. Id. at 612 (appointing committees “to draw up a report of the doings of this 
Convention” and “draw up a letter” to Congress). 
 216. Id. at 613–18. 
 217. The resolution is not clearly identified as a recommendation until near the end. Id. at 
618. 
 218. Id. at 618–19. 
 219. Id. at 619–20. 
 220. Id. at 620. 
 221. Id. at 615 (explaining why certain items of foreign production are excepted). 
 222. As unlikely as this appears, the journal seems to report that the delegates convened on 
a Sunday (February 1) at 5:00 p.m. to adopt the circular-letter resolution and to adjourn. Id. at 
620.  
 223. 10 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 170, 172 (Feb. 16, 1778). 
 224. Id. at 53, 55 (Jan. 15, 1778) (“[N]o limitation to be made by the Board of War, with 
respect to price, shall contravene any . . . of the regulations which may be made hereafter by the 
convention of committees which is to meet at New Haven, in Connecticut, on this fifteenth day 
of January[].”). See also id. at 170, 172 (Feb. 16, 1778); id. at 258, 260 (Mar. 16, 1778); id. at 
321–24 (May 8, 1778); 11 id. at 472 (May 7, 1778). 
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law.225 Those price controls were soon repealed on the recommendation 
of Congress, but adopted to an extent on the local level.226 
H.  The Hartford Convention of 1779227 
As the Revolutionary War continued, the value of paper money 
nosedived and trade wars grew among states.228 In a further effort to 
coordinate interstate price controls and other economic policies, the 
Massachusetts General Court (legislature) on September 28, 1779 called 
yet another multi-state convention.229 Massachusetts invited New York 
and the other New England states to meet at Hartford, Connecticut on 
October 20.230 The call provided that the convention was to promote “a 
free and general Intercourse . . . upon Principles correspondent with the 
public Good, and effectually to cut up and destroy the Practices of those 
People who prey both upon you and us . . .”231 The commissions of the 
Massachusetts delegates instructed them specifically to explain the 
motives for Massachusetts’ embargo law, to “concert . . . such Measures 
as may appear proper to appreciate our Currency,” and to “open a free 
and general Intercourse of Trade upon Principles correspondent with the 
public Good.”232 
The Massachusetts documents were not clear whether they 
contemplated a mere consultation or a meeting at which committees 
could “pledge the faith” of their respective governments. The call 
denominated the convention as a “Consultation,” but stated that its 
                                                                                                                     
 225. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 18; see also 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 521–22 
(reproducing Governor Trumbull’s recommendation based on the New Haven resolutions); 8 
R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 361 (reproducing resolution of the Rhode Island general 
assembly accepting the convention proceedings); id. at 381 (accepting committee report for bill 
controlling prices). 
 226. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 18; see Letter from Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of 
Connecticut, to William Green, Governor of Rhode Island (May 19, 1778), in 8 R.I. RECORDS, 
supra note 1, at 423–24 (complaining of Rhode Island’s non-compliance); Letter from William 
Green, Governor of Rhode Island, to Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut (May 29, 
1778), in 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 425 (explaining that Rhode Island cannot comply 
until Massachusetts does). 
 227. As is true of the conventions at Providence, York Town, Springfield, and New Haven, 
little has been written about the 1779 Hartford Convention. One must not confuse it with the far 
more famous interstate gathering at Hartford in 1814. 
 228. Josiah Bartlett, who represented New Hampshire at 1779 Hartford conclave, observed 
that “Land Embargoes” were then in effect in most of the five states at the convention. See 
Letter from Josiah Bartlett to Nathaniel Peabody (Oct. 20, 1779), in BARTLETT PAPERS, supra 
note 1, at 271. 
 229. 21 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 165–66.  
 230. Id. at 165. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 175; see also 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 564 (reproduction of 
Massachusetts resolution). 
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commissioners would have “full Powers to appear on the Part of this 
State.”233 The Massachusetts commissions used the verb “concert” 
rather than merely “consult,” “deliberate,” or “recommend.” 
The documents issued by the other states were clearer, but the 
commissions issued by New Hampshire contradicted the rest. New 
Hampshire authorized its delegates to “consult and agree” to virtually 
any measures.234 Rhode Island authorized its commissioners only to 
“meet” with the other delegates.235 Connecticut empowered its delegates 
to “deliberate and consult,”236 and New York empowered its 
commissioners to “consult and confer” on the subjects identified by 
Massachusetts as well as any others that might arise.237 Because of 
conflicting commissions, the convention could do no more than 
propose. 
The five states appointed 14 commissioners, of whom 13 attended. 
Massachusetts appointed its committee by legislative action, as did 
Connecticut and New York. In Rhode Island, commissioners were 
designated by the council of war, to which the legislature had delegated 
legislative power.238 In New Hampshire, they were appointed by the 
committee of safety, charged with the affairs of state during legislative 
recess.239 
The proceedings opened promptly on October 20, 1779. The more 
notable figures present included three Connecticut commissioners: 
Eliphat Dyer, veteran of three prior conventions;240 Benjamin 
Huntington, who had been at New Haven; and Oliver Ellsworth, new to 
the convention circuit, but fated to be a central figure at the 
Constitutional Convention and eventually Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court.241 Representing Massachusetts were Thomas Cushing, now 
serving in his fifth multi-state convention, and Nathaniel Gorham, who 
eight years later would chair the Committee of the Whole in 
Philadelphia.242 From New Hampshire came Josiah Bartlett, attending 
his third convention, and from New York William Floyd and John Sloss 
Hobart, each also attending his third. Stephen Hopkins, one of the two 
Rhode Island delegates, was now serving in his fifth multi-state 
                                                                                                                     
 233. 21 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 165. 
 234. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 563. 
 235. Id. at 564. 
 236. Id. at 564–65. 
 237. Id. at 565. 
 238. Supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 239. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 563–65. 
 240. See Appendix A (setting forth convention experience for each commissioner).  
 241. For a short sketch of Ellsworth’s contributions to this meeting and to the Philadelphia 
Price Convention, see BROWN, supra note 1, at 72. 
 242. ROSSITER, supra note 1, at 171 (reporting Gorham’s chairmanship of the committee of 
the whole).  
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meeting. He was elected president, as he had been at Providence and 
Springfield. In keeping with the tradition of choosing a non-delegate for 
secretary, the assembly elected Lt. Col. Hezakiah Wyllys.243 
With this kind of accumulated experience, it was scarcely necessary 
to adopt formal rules, and the journal mentions none. After reproducing 
the credentials, the journal does little but report final 
recommendations.244 They included repeal of embargoes, supplying 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire with flour, and 
further price regulations. Perhaps as a result of growing skepticism 
about the efficacy of the latter, the convention stressed the need to 
obtain supplies by taxing and borrowing rather than printing.245 
The group also decided to propose yet another multi-state 
convention. The call read as follows: 
That a Convention of Commissioners from the States of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
Connecticutt [sic], New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, be requested to meet at 
Philadelphia on the first Wednesday of January next, for 
the purpose of considering the expediency of limiting the 
prices of merchandize and produce, and if they judge such 
a measure to be expedient, then to proceed to limit the 
prices of such of said articles as they think proper in their 
several States in such manner as shall be best adapted to 
their respective situation and circumstances, and to report 
their proceedings to their respective Legislatures.246 
As the italicized language suggests, decisions at the Philadelphia 
meeting would bind their sovereigns. Hopkins’s circular letter to the 
other states also asserted that the proposed Philadelphia convention 
would “proceed to limit the prices” of articles, if it deemed proper.247 
The Hartford Convention did not invite the three southernmost states 
to Philadelphia. The purported reason was “[t]he great distance of North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.”248 Another possible reason is 
that those states may have been even more skeptical about price controls 
                                                                                                                     
 243. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 564. For his rank, see id. at 356. 
 244. Id. at 566–69. 
 245. Id. at 569. Josiah Bartlett of New Hampshire believed that price controls remained 
necessary because taxes would be insufficient to stabilize the currency. Letter from Josiah 
Bartlett to Nathaniel Peabody (Nov. 4, 1779), in BARTLETT PAPERS, supra note 1, at 272–73. 
 246. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 568 (emphasis added). 
 247. Id. at 571. 
 248. Id. at 570. 
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than some northerners were.249 Recall that all those states had refused to 
honor the two congressional calls for price conventions at Charleston.250 
After issuing its recommendations, the gathering adjourned, 
probably on October 28.251 Its proceedings seem to have been generally 
approved in Congress,252 and the convention’s price recommendations 
served as the basis for some of Congress’s own price edicts.253 
I.  The Philadelphia Price Convention of 1780 
The call for the Philadelphia Price Convention—yet another multi-
government gathering largely overlooked by scholars—was issued by 
the preceding Hartford Convention.254 The Philadelphia Price 
Convention was fated to be the final chapter in the sorry history255 of 
Revolutionary-Era interstate price controls. 
Of the ten states invited, seven attended.256 They were 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
                                                                                                                     
 249. See, e.g., Letter from the Connecticut Delegates to the Governor of Connecticut (Apr. 
29, 1778), in 3 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 202 (quoting the Connecticut delegates to Congress as 
doubting that the southern states would regulate prices).  
 250. See supra notes 172 and 205 and accompanying text. 
 251. The journal is not completely clear on that point, but the final documents are dated 
October 28. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 570–71. 
 252. See Letter from Henry Marchant to William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island (Nov. 
14, 1779), in 4 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 518–19 (expressing confidence that Congress would 
approve the convention’s proceedings); Letter from Samuel Huntington to Oliver Wolcott (Nov. 
26, 1779), in 4 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 527 (expressing a similar view). 
 253. 15 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 1287–91 (Nov. 19, 1779 resolution); Letter from 
Elbridge Gerry to the President of Congress (Feb. 19, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 41–
42 (stating that Congress fixed the price of flour according to the price agreed on at Hartford).  
 254. See supra text accompanying note 246; see also 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 634 
(reproducing Rhode Island resolution reciting the Hartford call while empowering a 
commissioner to Philadelphia). 
 255. As one historian recounts: 
Attempts at price control during the Revolution were all ineffectual. In 
general even advocates of such regulation looked upon it as a temporary 
expedient and palliative, while taxation, retrenchment in government 
expenditures, no further emissions of irredeemable paper currency, and the 
sinking of such paper already emitted were considered as the true cure for 
inflationary prices. Most members of Congress realized that large issues of fiat 
money would cause a decline in its value. . . . New Hampshire and other states 
learned from trial that price ceilings could be imposed but that producers could 
not be forced to sell their wares, that control often produced shortages in the 
midst of plenty, that beef would appear on the market when ceilings were 
removed and would vanish when they were imposed. People learned, too, that 
black-market operations would flourish under regulation. . . .  
See Scott, supra note 1, at 472. 
 256. Cf. BROWN, supra note 1, at 72 (alleging that four invited states did not show, but this 
refers to the very beginning of the convention). 
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Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. Those states were represented 
by 20 commissioners, among them such experienced convention hands 
as Connecticut’s Roger Sherman (three prior multi-state conventions) 
Oliver Ellsworth and Samuel Huntington (each with one prior); 
Delaware’s Thomas McKean (one), Maryland’s William Paca (one 
prior, but also a signer of the Declaration of Independence); and New 
Hampshire’s Nathaniel Folsom and Nathaniel Peabody (two each). This 
was also the first multi-state convention for Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts, who like Ellsworth and Sherman would play a 
significant role in writing the Constitution.257 
State legislatures had elected all these delegates.258 In Massachusetts, 
and perhaps in other states, the two chambers acted by joint ballot rather 
than seriatim.259 Unicameral Pennsylvania required, of course, only the 
vote of one house.260 
The commissions empowering the delegates displayed more 
uniformity than they had at Hartford. As requested by the call, all the 
commissions authorized delegates to bind their respective states. For 
example, New Hampshire empowered its commissioners “to limit the 
prices of articles,”261 New Jersey to “consult and agree” and “confer and 
agree,”262 and Massachusetts “to pledge the faith of this government.”263 
These commissions restricted the scope of delegates’ authority to bind 
their states to the subject of price limitation, sometimes with explicit 
reference to the call.264 Additionally, Rhode Island empowered its 
delegates to urge the convention to recommend repeal of state 
embargoes.265 
Initially, hopes had been high. In preparation for the convention, 
some commissioners conferred during early January of 1780.266 Formal 
proceedings began on January 29, 1780 in the Pennsylvania state house, 
                                                                                                                     
 257. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 415. 
 258. Connecticut designated its delegates in Congress as commissioners. Id. 
 259. Id. at 573. Some of the other commissions are not clear on this point. See, e.g., id. at 
576 (describing Pennsylvania’s selection of commissioners). 
 260. See PA. JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 398 (Nov. 18, 1779). 
 261. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 572. 
 262. Id. at 575. The New Jersey commission also empowered its committee to “report 
whatever measures the said Convention may think proper to recommend, to this Legislature,” id. 
at 576, but in light of the earlier wording this presumably applied to recommendations outside 
the call. 
 263. Id. at 573. 
 264. The commissions are reproduced at id. at 572–77. The commissions of Connecticut 
and New Jersey refer explicitly to Hartford. Id. at 574, 575. 
 265. Id. at 574 (reproducing resolution appointing William Ellery as commissioner). 
 266. Letter from Roger Sherman to Andrew Adams (Jan. 7, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra 
note 1, at 4 (reporting that six commissioners from four states had met, as well as an 
unauthorized representative from New York). 
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the building now called Independence Hall.267 The convention elected 
William Moore, then serving as vice president of Pennsylvania, as its 
president. Contrary to custom, the commissioners elected one of their 
number, Samuel Osgood of Massachusetts, as secretary.268 Because 
Osgood was a delegate, the convention decided that in the president’s 
absence Osgood was “authorized to take and declare the sense of the 
[convention] on all questions that shall come before them.”269 
The convention soon encountered snags. New Jersey had appointed 
two delegates, but when the convention opened they were nowhere to 
be found. The assembly wrote to request their attendance, apparently 
without success.270 In addition, they wrote to New York and Virginia, 
which also were absent.271 
Most of the delegates believed that without the participation of 
Virginia and New York, any general price-fixing agreement would 
fail.272 The results for the convention were multiple adjournments and 
inconclusive discussions. 
Whatever the reason for New Jersey’s absence, the non-participation 
by Virginia and New York seems to have been calculated. Virginia had 
attended the abortive and frustrating price convention at York Town 
(where it apparently had supported a price control recommendation),273 
but when Congress later asked Virginia to convene with neighboring 
states at Fredericksburg, it failed to do so.274 During the Philadelphia 
gathering a New Jersey congressional delegate complained that 
“Virginia seems to hang back; no members have attended frm [sic] 
thence, and as far as I can learn none have been appointed.”275 As for 
New York, there was no overt political basis for its absence, since the 
government in Albany already had “pledge[d] the faith of the State for 
carrying into effect a general plan for regulating prices . . . .”276 Nor was 
there a practical basis, for Ezra L’Hommedieu, who had represented the 
state at Hartford, was readily available. In fact, he had been in 
Philadelphia meeting with authorized delegates since early January.277 
 
                                                                                                                     
 267. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 572. 
 268. Id. at 577. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See id. 
 271. Id. at 578. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 274. Supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 275. Letter from Abraham Clark to Caleb Camp, Speaker of the Assembly (Feb. 7, 1780), 
in N.J. SELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 212. 
 276. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 578. 
 277. Letter from Roger Sherman to Andrew Adams (Jan. 7, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra 
note 1, at 4 (reporting on L’Hommedieu’s meeting with six commissioners from four states). 
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The fundamental reason for the failure of Virginia and New York to 
cooperate may have been widespread doubts about the feasibility and 
justice of price controls. Even in 1777, the same year Congress called 
several price conventions, Dr. Benjamin Rush had argued that: 
The wisdom & power of government have been employed 
in all ages to regulate the price of necessaries to no 
purpose. It was attempted in Engd in the reign of Edward II 
by the English parliament, but without effect. The laws for 
limiting the price of every thing were repealed, and Mr 
Hume [David Hume, the historian and philosopher], who 
mentions this fact, records even the very attempt as a 
monument of human folly. The Congress with all its 
authority have failed in a former instance of regulating the 
price of goods.278 
At the time, Rush’s views had been seconded by such leading figures as 
James Wilson, Jonathan Witherspoon, and John Adams.279 
Since 1777, reservations about the prudence of price controls had 
grown. The York Town Price Convention had failed, and the 
southernmost states had refused to hold any price conventions at all. 
Where controls had been imposed, they had proved spectacularly 
unsuccessful.280 So by the time the Philadelphia convention met, 
“[e]nthusiasm for [price] regulation was on the wane.”281 In instructions 
withheld from the rest of the convention, the Massachusetts legislature 
had communicated to its own commissioners grave doubts about the 
entire price-fixing enterprise.282 
In an effort to rescue the situation, on February 7 an unnamed 
commissioner moved several resolutions. One was to request the 
presence of Virginia and another of New York. A third resolution was 
to appoint a committee to draft a price-limitation plan. The journal is 
unclear whether this motion was adopted, although it likely was.283 
What is clear is that the following day the assembly adjourned until 
April 4, apparently never to re-convene.284 
                                                                                                                     
 278. Rush, Notes, supra note 1, at 135. 
 279. Id. at 137–38. 
 280. See Scott, supra note 1, at 472. 
 281. Id. at 471. 
 282. 21 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 307–08 (reproducing a letter of instruction in 
which perhaps half consisted of an attack on price controls’ that portion was deleted in the 
convention version); see also 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 573. 
 283. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 578–79. 
 284. Id. at 579; see also BROWN, supra note 1, at 72–73; CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 19; PA. 
JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 422 (Feb. 14, 1780). 
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J.  The Boston Convention of 1780 
The Boston Convention of 1780 was the smallest of the Founding 
Era multi-government conventions: five delegates from three states.285 
Contemporaries sometimes referred to it as “the Committee from the 
New England States”286 or the “Eastern Convention.”287 It has received 
slightly more scholarly attention than most of the other Founding-Era 
conventions.288 
The motive for the gathering appears to have been military, although 
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer of Maryland thought it might also have 
been related to New York’s diplomatic movement away from New 
England and toward Virginia.289 But no other motive other than military 
appears in the records. 
For the Americans, the military situation in 1780 was grave. 
Moreover, New England (specifically Rhode Island) was hosting a 
French army, and that army needed to be supplied. Letters from General 
Washington asked Congress to ensure adequate supplies, and Congress 
in turn urged the states to do so.290 
The convention call came from Connecticut, and was addressed to 
the other three New England states.291 It was initiated in a letter dated 
July 14, 1780 from Governor Jonathan Trumbull to Governor William 
Greene of Rhode Island in which Trumbell sought the support of Rhode 
Island for the meeting.292 In the letter, Trumbull bemoaned the war 
situation and noted the difficulties of supplying the French and their 
irritation at high prices, and proceeded as follows: 
To effect which, with the greater Expedition, we have 
thought it necessary to send one of our Board [i.e., council] 
to meet such Gentlemen as may be appointed from the 
States of Rhode Island, Massachusetts and New 
                                                                                                                     
 285. If 1768 be judged part of the Founding Era, the statement in the text must be qualified. 
That year, only three colonies attended a meeting with the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix (Rome), 
rendering it as small (aside from the Iroquois) as the Boston Convention. The attending colonies 
at Fort Stanwix were New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY, supra note 
1, at 197. 
 286. Letter from Ezekial Cornell to William Greene (Aug. 29, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra 
note 1, at 347. 
 287. Letter from James Duane to George Washington (Sept. 19, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra 
note 1, at 378–79. 
 288. See generally BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1. 
 289. Letter from Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to Thomas Sim Lee (Sept. 26, 1780), in 5 
LETTERS, supra note 1, at 391–92.  
 290. See BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at ix–xxix (reproducing correspondence). 
 291. Baldwin, supra note 1, at 38; see BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 53–55 
(reproducing letter); 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 153 (same). 
 292. See Letter from Jonathan Trumbull to William Green (July 15, 1780), in BOSTON 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 53–55. 
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Hampshire, or such of them as shall concur in the Measure, 
at Boston, as early next Week as possible, to confer on 
these and other important Subjects peculiarly necessary at 
this Day; to agree upon and adopt such similar Measures as 
may be most conducive to the general Interest.  
We have forwarded this Intimation by an Express to the 
Council of War, at Providence; and if agreeable to them, it 
is requested they would unite in their request with ours, to 
the Council of War at Boston, by them immediately to be 
communicated to the President and Council in New 
Hampshire, for the Purpose that such Convention may be 
held at Boston with all possible Expedition.293 
The call seemed to ask for Rhode Island and Massachusetts 
commissioners to be designated by those states’ councils of war and for 
the New Hampshire commissioners to be appointed by the legislature. 
However, a call from one sovereign could not dictate how other 
sovereigns selected their delegates, as the convention realized by 
seating delegates however selected. In Massachusetts and Connecticut, 
the council of safety did appoint the commissioners, but in both of the 
other states the authorities deviated from Governor Trumbull’s 
suggested method of appointment. In New Hampshire, the delegate was 
chosen not by the legislature, but by the committee of safety.294 In 
Rhode Island, the governor referred the request to the general 
assembly,295 which elected William Bradford.296 
When the convention met on August 3, three commissioners from 
Massachusetts were in attendance together with one each from 
Connecticut and New Hampshire. Bradford, the Rhode Island delegate, 
proved unable to attend.297 
Three of the five commissioners had prior convention experience. 
They were Nathaniel Gorham and Thomas Cushing of Massachusetts 
and Jesse Root of Connecticut, who substituted for Eliphalet Dyer 
(another seasoned conventioneer). Cushing had attended five previous 
conventions.298 The group elected him president, and a non-delegate, 
                                                                                                                     
 293. BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
 294. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559–60. 
 295. 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 161 (reproducing letters from Governor William 
Greene of Rhode Island to the governor of Connecticut and the president of the council 
[governor] of Massachusetts). 
 296. Id. at 172–73. 
 297. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559; see Letter from James Bowdoin, President of 
Massachusetts Council, to William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island (July 24, 1780), in 9 R.I. 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 300 (complaining of Rhode Island’s absence). 
 298. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559.  
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Henry Alline, clerk.299 
This was a proposal convention merely. The Massachusetts 
commission empowered delegates only to 
consult and advise [deliberate] on all such business and 
affairs as shall be brought under consideration, relative to 
the war, and to promote and forward the most vigorous 
exertions of the present campaign, and to cultivate a good 
understanding and procure a generous treatment of the 
officers and men of our great and generous Ally 
[i.e., France], and make report thereof accordingly.300 
The language of the other commissions was similar, except that New 
Hampshire, as at Hartford, permitted its commissioner to wander farther 
afield: He could “consult and advise . . . on any other matters that may 
be thought advisable for the public good.”301 
The journal tells us little about the substance of the convention, 
except for a lengthy list of recommendations. Most dealt with matters of 
military detail. However, the convention further recommended that land 
embargoes be repealed and water embargoes be continued, that bills of 
credit be sunk, and that those states that had not ratified the Articles of 
Confederation do so.302 The recommendations dealing with bills of 
credit and embargoes might seem to be outside the scope of the 
convention, but prices and trade restrictions were key aspects of the 
military struggle. In fact, the convention call included specific reference 
to the need to protect the French army from “being imposed and 
extorted upon by extravagant Prices by Individuals.”303 The convention 
justified its two-fold recommendations on embargoes by stating that 
land embargoes should be repealed because they tended to injure rather 
than serve the common cause, while water embargos should remain 
with “particular care . . . to prevent all illicit trade with the enemy.”304 
Just as the first Hartford Convention had called the convention at 
Philadelphia, the Boston gathering extended a conditional invitation to 
any and all other states to a second meeting at Hartford.305 It adjourned 
on August 9.306 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 299. Id. at 561. 
 300. Id. at 559. 
 301. Id. at 560–61. 
 302. Id. at 561–64. 
 303. See BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 54. 
 304. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 562. 
 305. Id. at 564. 
 306. Id.  
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These proceedings and recommendations were praised in Congress 
as consistent with congressional policies.307 General Washington wrote 
that they were “the most likely Means that could be adopted to rescue 
our Affairs from the complicated and dreadful Embarrassments under 
which they labor, and will do infinite Honor to those with whom they 
originate.”308 The Massachusetts legislature took note of the 
recommendations that all states adhere to the Articles of Confederation 
and that the confederation government be organized on a regular basis. 
The Massachusetts legislature signaled its willingness to overlook the 
unanimity rule and “to confederate with such other nine, or more, of the 
United States, as will accede to the Confederation.”309 
K.  The Hartford Convention of 1780 
The Boston Convention’s call to Hartford was conditional in form. It 
read as follows: 
And it is further recommended, that in case the war 
continues and Congress should not take measures for the 
purpose and notify the States aforesaid by the first of 
November next, that the said States do at all events furnish 
their quota of men and provisions, and charge the same to 
the United States; and to procure uniformity in the 
measures that may be necessary to be taken by these States 
in common with each other, this Convention recommend a 
meeting of Commissioners from the several States to be 
held at Hartford on the 2d Wednesday of November next, 
and invite the State of New York and others to join them 
that shall think proper.310 
Pursuant to this call, nine of the eleven commissioners elected by the 
legislatures of New York and the four New England states gathered on 
November 8, 1780.311 Among them was Rhode Island’s William 
Bradford who also had been elected to the Boston Convention, but had 
been unable to attend.312 The convention elected Bradford as its 
                                                                                                                     
 307. See Letter from the Connecticut Delegates to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 1, 
1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 351–52. 
 308. BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at xxxii–xxxiii. 
 309. 21 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 640; cf. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of 
the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution 
between the States so ratifying the Same.”). 
 310. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 563–64. 
 311. Id. at 564 (setting forth commissions and attendance list). Connecticut had elected as a 
third member of its committee Andrew Adams, Jr., Id. at 179, but he withdrew for several 
reasons. Id. at 237; 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 258–59 (reproducing legislative resolution). 
 312. Supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
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president and Hezakiah Wyllys, a non-delegate, as secretary.313 Wyllys 
had served as secretary at the Hartford gathering the previous year.314 
During the proceedings, his father George (the Connecticut secretary of 
state)315 replaced him for a time,316 but Hezekiah returned for the end.317 
Most of the delegates were veterans of previous conventions. 
Bradford was attending his third convention, Connecticut’s Eliphalet 
Dyer his fifth, and Thomas Cushing of Massachusetts his seventh. 
Cushing’s colleague, Azor Orne, was attending his second convention, 
and John Sloss Hobart of New York his fourth. 
The commissions issued by the New England states all specified 
military affairs as the topic and limited their delegates to conferring and 
recommending. New York commissioned its committee to consider “all 
measures as shall appear calculated to give a vigor to the governing 
powers equal to the present crises.”318 Accompanying the New York 
commission were instructions to propose and agree to, in the said 
Convention, “that Congress should, during the present War, or until a 
perpetual Confederation shall be completed, be explicitly authorized 
and empowered, to exercise every Power which they [i.e., Congress] 
may deem necessary for an effectual Prosecution of the War . . . .”319 In 
other words, the New York delegates had been instructed to seek a grant 
of plenary power to Congress. 
Nothing of the debates survives except for formal recommendations, 
a letter to Congress, and a letter to the non-participating states. The 
recommendations were sweeping, but all were connected with the war 
and with issues of military funding and supply.320 New York’s proposal 
to grant broad powers to Congress was not acted on. 
Some of the recommendations were noteworthy. The convention 
asserted that “the Commander-in-Chief ought to have the sole discretion 
of the military operations, and an individual should have the charge of 
each department.”321 Congress adopted the department proposal rather 
                                                                                                                     
 313. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 564. 
 314. Supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 315. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 6. 
 316. Id. at 569. For the relationship, see Portal for Online Museum Catalog, CONN. HIST.  
SOC’Y MUSEUM & LIBR., http://emuseum.chs.org:8080/emuseum/ (search for “Hezekiah 
Wyllys”; then follow second “Hezekiah Wyllys” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
 317. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 574. The transition from son to father and back to 
father was not surprising. Three generations of Wyllyses held the office of secretary of 
Connecticut continuously from 1712 to 1810. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 317 
(editor’s note). 
 318. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 566. 
 319. THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AT THE 
FIRST MEETING OF THE FOURTH SESSION BEGUN AND HOLDEN AT POUGHKEEPSIE IN DUTCHESS 
COUNTY ON THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7TH, 1780 58–59 (Munsell & Rowland reprint, 1859) 
 320. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 570–72. 
 321. Id. at 573. 
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quickly.322 The convention further recommended that states “pledge 
their faith” to legally enforce congressional fund-raising decisions.323 
This proposal became law, at least in theory, a few months later, when 
the thirteenth state (Maryland) ratified the Articles of Confederation. 
Frustrated by the failure of states to meet their fund-raising quotas, 
the convention also recommended 
the several states represented in this Convention, to instruct 
their respective Delegates to use their influence in Congress 
that the Commander-in-Chief . . . be authorized and 
empowered to take such measures as he may deem proper 
and the publick [sic] service may render necessary, to 
induce the several States to a punctual compliance with the 
requisitions which have been made or may be made by 
Congress for supplies for the year 1780 and 1781.324 
This proposed grant of near dictatorial authority to George Washington 
proved controversial,325 and Congress never approved it. 
The gathering apparently dissolved on November 22. That, at least, 
was the date of the convention’s letter to the other states.326 
L.  The Abortive and Successful Providence Conventions of 1781 
At the 1780 Hartford Convention the participating states called for 
yet another meeting at an early date.327 The subject would be military 
affairs, and the gathering would include representatives of the French 
military stationed in Providence.328 On February 21, the Connecticut 
general assembly asked that the call be expanded to include the request 
of Vermont to be admitted to the union.329 Governor Trumbull 
accordingly wrote to the other states announcing the expanded subject 
matter.330 In the same letter, he fixed a meeting date of April 12, 
                                                                                                                     
 322. See 19 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at ix (editor’s prefatory note); id. at 124–26 (Feb. 
7, 1781); id. at 155–57 (Feb. 16, 1781). The convention’s recommendations were first noted in 
Congress on December 12, 1780. 18 id. at 1141 (Dec. 12, 1780). 
 323. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 571. 
 324. Id. 
 325. See, e.g., Letter from John Witherspoon to William Livingston, Governor of New 
Jersey (Dec. 16, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra note 1 at 487; Letter from James Warren to Samuel 
Adams (Dec. 4, 1780), in id. at 488 n.8. 
 326. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 573. 
 327. See Letter from Connecticut Governor Trumbull to Governor of Rhode Island (Mar. 9, 
1781), in 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 378. 
 328. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 575–76. 
 329. Id. at 316–17 (Feb. 21, 1781); see also 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 343 
(reproducing resolution). 
 330. E.g., Letter from Connecticut Governor Trumbull to Governor of Rhode Island (Mar. 
9, 1781), in 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 378 (reproducing Trumbull’s circular letter). 
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1781.331 
At the appointed time, only five delegates had arrived: Thomas 
Cushing from Massachusetts, Jonathan Trumbull, Jr. from Connecticut, 
and three Rhode Island commissioners. New York, New Hampshire, 
and the French all failed to appear. Those present tarried until April 17, 
then returned home. Before leaving, they agreed to “represent with 
much regret to the several States, that the seeming neglect on this 
occasion could not but give them a painful prospect . . . of any future 
proposed meeting of the States,” and that “the interests of the States 
might be subjected to very substantial detriment.”332 
On June 12, 1781, the Massachusetts legislature issued a resolution 
calling for the New England states to meet at Providence on June 25, 
and appointing two Massachusetts commissioners.333 The call described 
as the purpose of the gathering “to agree upon some regular method of 
sending on supplies of beef, &c. to the army, during the present 
year.”334 Only five delegates convened on June 26, but they represented 
all four New England states. Two delegates were convention veterans: 
Jabez Bowen of Rhode Island, who had been at New Haven, and John 
Taylor Gilman of New Hampshire, a commissioner the preceding year 
at Hartford. The little group chose Bowen as president and, contrary to 
usual practice, one of its own members, Justin Ely of Massachusetts, as 
clerk.335 
This second Providence Convention made several supply 
recommendations, and disbanded after its second day.336 
M.  On the Road to Annapolis: Abortive Conventions and the First State 
Legislative “Application” 
As noted earlier, the New York commissioners to the 1780 Hartford 
Convention had been instructed to promote a grant of greater powers to 
Congress.337 On July 21, 1782, that state’s legislature followed up with 
a resolution concluding as follows:  
It appears to this Legislature, that the foregoing 
important Ends, can never be attained by partial 
                                                                                                                     
 331. Id.; 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 574. 
 332. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 575. 
 333. 1780–1781 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 614. 
 334. Id. at 614. 
 335. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 575. 
 336. Id. at 575–76. At least one state, Rhode Island, proceeded to put some of the 
recommendations into effect. 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 439–40 (reproducing legislative 
resolution); Letter from Governor Greene to General Washington (July 11, 1781), in 9 R.I. 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 453–54 (outlining state’s compliance). The state paid Bowen £2/5s 
for his service as commissioner. 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 453. 
 337. Supra Part III.K.  
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Deliberations of the States, separately, but that it is 
essential to the Common Welfare, that there should be as 
soon as possible a Conference of the Whole on the Subject; 
and that it would be advisable for this Purpose, to propose 
to Congress to recommend, and to each State to adopt, the 
Measure of assembling a General Convention of the States, 
specially authorised to revise and amend the Confederation, 
reserving a Right to the respective Legislatures, to ratify 
their Determinations.338 
Similarly, on February 13, 1783, the Massachusetts legislature called 
a more modest convention: a meeting of New York and the New 
England states to be held at Hartford 
to confer . . . on the necessity of adopting within the said 
States, for their respective uses, such general and uniform 
system of taxation by impost and excise, as may be thought 
advantageous to the said States, which system being agreed 
on by the majority of the delegates so to be convened, shall 
be recommended to the legislatures of the said States. . . .339 
John Hancock, now occupying the newly-created office of 
governor, extended the formal invitation to the other states.340 
The Massachusetts call was extraordinary for the suggestion that 
delegates vote as individuals rather than as states. None of the other 
calls had attempted to specify voting rules for a proposed convention, 
and all previous multi-government gatherings apparently had operated 
on a one-state/one vote principle.341 This may explain the subsequent 
response: Although in recess of the legislature, the governor and council 
of safety of Connecticut appointed three commissioners,342 New 
Hampshire and Rhode Island simply refused to do so. Massachusetts 
rescinded the call the following month.343 
Undaunted, on May 31, 1785, Massachusetts Governor James 
Bowdoin addressed the state’s lawmakers, urging them to promote a 
                                                                                                                     
 338. 5 DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, No. 11, Pt. 2, 28–29 
(1904).  
 339. 1782–1783 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 382. 
 340. Letter from William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island, to John Hancock, Governor 
of Massachusetts (Feb. 28, 1783), in 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 685 (stating, “I am 
favored with your Excellency’s letter respecting the proposed convention of the five Eastern 
states, which is now before our General Assembly”). 
 341. See generally Part III.  
 342. 5 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 101–02. 
 343. 1782–1783 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 482–83 (Mar. 26, 1783) (rescinding call 
due to two states “having refused to choose delegates to meet”). 
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“Convention or Congress” of “special delegates from the States” to 
amend the Articles of Confederation and grant the Confederation 
Congress more authority.344 The legislature responded on July 1 by 
adopting the New York formula in a resolution asking Congress for a 
general convention to revise the Articles.345 In its accompanying 
circular letter to the other states, the legislature designated this action as 
“[making] application to the United States in Congress assembled.”346 
This pre-constitutional use of the word “application” is almost identical 
to the use of that word in Article V. Previous discourse sometimes 
referred to the call as an “application.”347 
In addition to its “application” and circular letter, the Massachusetts 
legislature issued a letter to the president of Congress. This asked 
Congress “to recommend a Convention of the States at some convenient 
                                                                                                                     
 344. See 1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 709–10 (speech of May 31, 1785);  
see also id. at 708. 
 345. The full text is as follows: 
RESOLVE RECOMMENDING A CONVENTION OF DELEGATES FROM 
ALL THE STATES, FOR THE PURPOSE MENTIONED. 
 
As the prosperity and happiness of a nation, cannot be secured without a 
due proportion of power lodged in the hands of the Supreme Rulers of the 
State, the present embarrassed situation of our public affairs, must lead the 
mind of the most inattentive observer to realize the necessity of a revision of the 
powers vested in the Congress of the United States, by the Articles of 
Confederation: 
And as we conceive it to be equally the duty and the privilege of every 
State in the Union, freely to communicate their sentiments to the rest on every 
subject relating to their common interest, and to solicit their concurrence in 
such measures as the exigency of their public affairs may require: 
Therefore Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Court, that the present 
powers of the Congress of the United States, as contained in the Articles of 
Confederation, are not fully adequate to the great purposes they were originally 
designed to effect. 
Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Court, that it is highly expedient, if 
not indispensibly necessary, that there should be a Convention of Delegates 
from all the States in the Union, at some convenient place, as soon as may be, 
for the sole purpose of revising the confederation, and reporting to Congress 
how far it may be necessary to alter or enlarge the same. 
Resolved, That Congress be, and they are hereby requested to recommend a 
Convention of Delegates from all the States, at such time and place as they may 
think convenient, to revise the confederation, and report to Congress how far it 
may be necessary, in their opinion, to alter or enlarge the same, in order to 
secure and perpetuate the primary objects of the Union. 
1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 666 (July 1, 1785). 
 346. Circular Letter of the Massachusetts General Court to the Supreme Executive of Each 
State (July 1, 1785), in 1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 667.  
 347. E.g., 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 589. 
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place, on an early day, [so] that the evils so severely experienced from 
the want of adequate powers in the foederal [sic] Government, may find 
a remedy as soon as possible.”348 The legislature issued formal 
instructions to Massachusetts’ congressional delegates to promote the 
application.349 
Yet Congress failed to act. 
While New York and Massachusetts were promoting a general 
convention, Pennsylvania decided to seek another regional one. 
Pennsylvanians wished to improve the navigability of the Susquehanna 
and Schuykill Rivers,350 and Marylanders wished to improve the 
navigability of the Susquehanna.351 Pennsylvanians also discussed 
connecting Susquehanna and Schuylkill River navigation by digging a 
canal across what is now called the Delmarva Peninsula,352 a project 
that would require cooperation from Maryland and Delaware. The latter 
state was, however, upset with both of its neighbors because of the 
tariffs imposed on Delawareans when they imported goods through 
Baltimore and Philadelphia.353 
Pennsylvania political leaders suggested a tri-state convention to 
foster a comprehensive settlement. On November 18, 1785, a committee 
of Pennsylvania’s unicameral General Assembly proposed 
that a negociation [sic] be entered into with the States of 
Maryland and Delaware upon the ground of reciprocal 
advantages to be derived, to all the States concerned, from 
a communication between the said two Bays as well as 
from an effectual improvement of the navigation of the 
river Susquehanna and its streams.354 
On November 23, the assembly authorized the Supreme Executive 
Council to open negotiations.355 On November 25, the council 
president, Benjamin Franklin, sent a letter of invitation to the governor 
of Maryland.356 The next day, the council vice president, Charles Biddle 
(who seems to have been carrying much of the burden for the aged 
                                                                                                                     
 348. 1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 667 (italics omitted) (July 1, 1785). 
 349. Id. at 668 (July 1, 1785). 
 350. See Lillard, supra note 1, at 10–11; 10 PA. ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 128–30 (1783 
legislative committee report); id. at 312 (election of replacement commissioner on subject); id. 
at 315 (committee report received). 
 351. See Lillard, supra note 1, at 11. 
 352. See id. at 16; see also MINUTES, PA. ASSEMBLY, supra note 1, at 29 (proposed bill 
from 1st session, November 8, 1785). 
 353. Lillard, supra note 1, at 12. 
 354. 10 PA. ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 538 (Nov. 18, 1786). 
 355. 14 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 582. 
 356. Id. at 585; see also 10 PA. ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 540 (containing the text of the 
letter). 
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Franklin), dispatched a similar invitation to Delaware.357 The 
negotiations were to be “for the purpose of opening ‘a navigable 
communication between the Bays of Chesepeak [sic] and Delaware, and 
for an effectual improvement of the river Susquehanna, and its 
streams.’”358 Consistently with the wording of these letters, the 
proposed meeting came to be referred to as the “Navigation 
Convention,” to distinguish it from the more general “Commercial 
Convention” then being planned for Annapolis. 
Commissioners at the navigation conclave would negotiate, but any 
results were to constitute proposals only. There was no suggestion that 
the convention would bind the participating states. 
Delaware’s initial reaction was negative. In January, 1786, a 
committee of that state’s legislature recommended against participating. 
The reason cited was that the proposed canal would devalue Delaware’s 
carrying trade. The committee recommended instead that the legislature 
concentrate on improving the roads spanning the peninsula.359 
Maryland was willing to meet, provided the agenda be expanded 
beyond improvements on the Susquehanna and the projected canal. On 
February 20, Maryland lawmakers approved participation if the meeting 
included “other subjects which may tend to promote the commerce, and 
mutual convenience of the said states.”360 On the same day, a joint 
legislative session elected its commissioners: Samuel Chase, Samuel 
Hughes, Peregrine Lethrbury, William Smith, and William Hemsley.361 
A few days later, Vice President Biddle wrote to the Pennsylvania 
legislature celebrating this progress, and advocating that his state also 
participate in Virginia’s proposed “Commercial Convention” at 
Annapolis. Biddle added that Navigation Convention negotiations had 
begun, but failed to mention when or where.362 
In March, 1786, the Maryland legislature authorized its Navigation 
Convention delegates to discuss interstate tariffs.363 The following 
month, the Pennsylvania assembly authorized payment for its delegates 
and selected its committee: Francis Hopkinson (who had signed the 
Declaration of Independence), John Ewing, David Rittenhouse (the 
famous astronomer), Robert Milligan and George Lattimer.364 
                                                                                                                     
 357. 10 PA. ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 540–41. 
 358. Id. at 540. 
 359. Report upon the President’s Message, Jan. 11, 1786 (read, Jan. 16, 1786) (on file with 
Delaware State Archives). 
 360. See generally PROCEEDINGS, MD. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 1, at 149–50 (Feb. 
20, 1786); id. at 199 (Mar. 12, 1786). 
 361. PROCEEDINGS, MD. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 1, at 150 (Feb. 20, 1786). 
 362. See 14 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 644–45 (Feb. 22, 1786). 
 363. PROCEEDINGS, MD. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 1, at 199 (Mar. 12, 1786). 
 364. 10 PA. ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 755; 15 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 2 
(Apr. 5, 1786). There were some delays in selecting the Pennsylvania commissioners. 14 
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Delaware finally responded positively in June, approving 
participation in both the Navigation Convention and the more general 
Annapolis Commercial Convention.365 As its Navigation Convention 
committee, Delaware lawmakers chose William Killen; Gunning 
Bedford, Jr.; John Jones; Robert Armstrong, and Eleazar McComb.366 
Authority was limited to proposing only, but encompassed not only the 
Susquehanna and the canal, but “any other subject that may tend to 
promote the commerce and the mutual convenience of the said 
states.”367 
It is doubtful whether the three state committees ever met or even 
corresponded. In August, 1786, President Benjamin Franklin reported to 
the Pennsylvania assembly that “[s]ome farther progress has been made 
in the negociation [sic] with the States of Delaware and Maryland since 
your last session: Commissioners have been appointed, an interview 
proposed, and every inclination to meet this Commonwealth on the 
ground of reciprocal advantage discovered [revealed].”368 This 
statement of “progress” rather more suggests a lack of substantive 
discussion than its occurrence. 
The reasons the Navigation Convention proved abortive are not fully 
understood. One reason may have been that the invitations issued by 
President Franklin and Vice President Biddle (essentially, the 
convention “call”) were radically defective: Unlike all successful calls, 
they failed to specify a time and place of meeting. Also, the project may 
have been lost amid the more momentous bustle in Annapolis and 
Philadelphia. Once the Navigation Convention’s scope was extended 
beyond two specific projects to include commerce in general, it 
overlapped the topics on the agenda in Annapolis and Philadelphia. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, both contemporaneous accounts and subsequent 
generations sometimes mistook Navigation Convention records for 
those pertaining to Annapolis.369 
                                                                                                                     
MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 669 (assigning a future date for the election); id. at 672 
(postponing the date and erroneously stating the date of the original resolution as March 21 
instead of March 23). 
 365. See MINUTES, DELAWARE COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 970–72; PROCEEDINGS, 
DELAWARE ASSEMBLY, supra note 1, at 375–76 (June 15, 1786). 
 366. MINUTES, DELAWARE COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 971. For the commissions’ 
backgrounds, see id. at 25 (editors’ introduction). 
 367. PROCEEDINGS, DELAWARE ASSEMBLY, supra note 1, at 376. 
 368. 15 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 70 (Aug. 25, 1786). 
 369. See, e.g., 14 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 672 (erroneously identifying the 
resolution authorizing the Navigation Convention, adopted March 23, 1786, with the Annapolis 
Convention resolution adopted on March 21, 1786); see also MINUTES, PA. ASSEMBLY, supra 
note 1, at 227 (2d Session, Mar. 21, 1786) (regarding the Annapolis resolution); id. at 230 (Mar. 
23, 1786) (regarding the National Convention resolution). 
A Delaware archivist has informed me that records in his office pertaining to the Navigation 
Convention were erroneously filed in the location for the Annapolis Convention. E-mail from 
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N.  The Annapolis Commercial Convention of 1786 
More concrete progress toward another multi-state convention came 
from Virginia. Successful negotiations with Maryland in March, 1785 
over Potomac and Chesapeake navigation rights encouraged Virginia 
political leaders to seek further inter-governmental cooperation.370 On 
January 21, 1786, the state legislature adopted a resolution calling a 
convention 
to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to 
examine the relative situations and trade of the States; to 
consider how far a uniform system in their commercial 
regulations may be necessary to their common interest and 
their permanent harmony; and to report to the several States 
such an act relative to this great object, as, when 
unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United States 
in Congress effectually to provide for the same.371 
This call was for a general, not a mere regional, convention. Its subject 
matter was commerce. Thus, in the contemporaneous records, the 
Annapolis conclave often is referred to as a “commercial 
convention.”372 
The Virginia legislature followed up this resolution with a circular 
letter inviting the other states to meet on “the first Monday in 
September next,” September 4, 1786.373 In March, Governor Bowdoin 
excitedly relayed the news to Massachusetts lawmakers,374 and three 
months later those lawmakers elected four delegates375 and fixed their 
compensation.376 Shortly thereafter, they empowered the governor and 
council to fill any vacancies.377 
Yet a full week after the convention was to have met, the 
Massachusetts delegates were still absent. So also were the appointed 
commissioners from Rhode Island. Only five states were in attendance, 
represented collectively by 12 commissioners. The states were New 
                                                                                                                     
Bruce H. Haase to Robert G. Natelson (Aug. 13, 2012) (on file with author). 
 370. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 22. 
 371. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 15 (2d ed. 1937) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting HOUSE OF DELEGATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
1786, 153 (Thomas W. White ed. 1828)). 
 372. See, e.g., 14 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 645 (Feb. 23, 1785); 15 
MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 82, 86 (Sept. 20, 1786). 
 373. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 23 (quoting 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 
180). 
 374. See 1784–85 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 915 (communication of March 20, 
1786). 
 375. 1786–87 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 286–87. 
 376. Id. at 304. 
 377. Id. at 312. 
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York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The 
commissioners from Massachusetts and Rhode Island were to learn in 
mid-journey that the meeting already had adjourned.378 
The delegates present included several convention alumni. John 
Dickinson of Pennsylvania and served in the Stamp Act Congress, and 
also in the First Continental Congress with his colleague, George 
Read.379 New York’s Egbert Benson had been at Hartford in 1780.380 
There also were notable newcomers: James Madison and Edmund 
Randolph of Virginia, Alexander Hamilton of New York, William 
Houston of New Jersey, and Richard Bassett of Delaware. All these 
newcomers were to represent their states in Philadelphia the following 
year—as would Dickinson and Read. Also present were Tench Coxe of 
Pennsylvania and St. George Tucker of Virginia, both of whom became 
highly influential in molding the public’s perception of the 
Constitution.381 
The delegates’ credentials closely tracked the call,382 except that 
those of Delaware stipulated that any convention proposal had to be 
reported “to the United States in Congress assembled, to be agreed to by 
them, and confirmed by the Legislatures of every State.”383 
The commissioners unanimously elected Dickinson, then the most 
distinguished of their number, as Chairman. The proceedings do not 
disclose a secretary. 
Although other multi-state conventions had succeeded with a 
representation from only five states, the delegates did not believe that 
number was sufficient for crafting a trade regime national in scope.384 
They therefore took the same course the commissioners at the abortive 
1781 Providence convention had taken—they issued a statement and 
adjourned. The statement read in part as follows: 
Your Commissioners, with the most respectful deference, 
beg leave to suggest their unanimous conviction, that it 
may essentially tend to advance the interests of the union, if 
                                                                                                                     
 378. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 24. Caplan blames the tardiness of their appointment, but the 
Massachusetts legislature had appointed its commissioners on June 17. See 1786–87 MASS. 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 286–87.  
 379. 1 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 13–14, 74. 
 380. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 565.  
 381. Coxe was among the most influential Federalist essayists during the ratification fight. 
JACOB E. COOKE, TENCH COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 111 (1978) (describing Coxe’s 
influence). Tucker wrote the first formal legal commentary on the Constitution, THE VIEW OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1803). 
 382. Proceedings, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/annapoli.asp (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 383. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 384. Id. (“Your Commissioners did not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business of 
their mission, under the Circumstance of so partial and defective a representation.”). 
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the States, by whom they have been respectively delegated, 
would themselves concur, and use their endeavours [sic] to 
procure the concurrence of the other States, in the 
appointment of Commissioners, to meet at Philadelphia on 
the second Monday in May next, to take into consideration 
the situation of the United States, to devise such further 
provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the 
constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the 
exigencies of the Union; and to report such an Act for that 
purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as 
when agreed to, by them, and afterwards confirmed by the 
Legislatures of every State, will effectually provide for the 
same.385 
The first italicized passage makes it clear that the Annapolis 
Convention was directing its resolution to the five states that had sent 
commissioners—not to other states, and not to Congress. 
The second italicized passage contemplated a convention that could 
do more than merely propose changes in the Articles of Confederation. 
It contemplated a convention to propose changes “to render the 
constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of 
the Union.” The word “constitution” in this context was not limited to 
the Articles of Confederation, as some modern writers assume. The 
prevailing political definition of “constitution” at the time was the 
political structure as a whole—much as we refer today to the British 
“constitution.” Although Americans had begun to apply the word a few 
years earlier to specific documents organizing state governments, the 
usage was not yet dominant, and no contemporaneous dictionary 
defined “constitution” that way.386 What we today call a “constitution” 
was more often called an “instrument,” “frame,” “system,” or “form” of 
                                                                                                                     
 385. Id. (emphasis added). 
 386. See, e.g., 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1775) (“The act of constituting, the state of being, the corporeal frame, the temper 
of the mind, and established form of government, a particular law.”); NATHAN BAILEY, AN 
UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (25th ed. 1783) (“[A]n ordinance or decree; 
the state of the body; the form of government used in any place; the law of a kingdom.”); 
SAMUEL JOHNSON, 1 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1786 ed.) (giving as political 
meanings “[e]stablished form of government; system of laws and customs” and “[p]articular 
law; establishment; institution”); THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1789) (similar definitions). 
Perhaps the closest analogue in these definitions to the modern use of “constitution” is the 
phrase “particular law,” a usage deriving from the Roman constitutio, which denominated any 
official ruling by the emperor. WOLFGANG KUNKEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 127 (J.M. Kelly trans., 2d ed. 1973). 
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government.”387 Thus, the Annapolis report was recommending a 
convention to consider and propose alterations in the federal political 
system, not merely to the Articles. Subsequent proceedings in Congress 
confirm that understanding.388 
The Annapolis Convention adjourned on September 14, and 
Chairman Dickinson’s letter on its behalf was read in Congress on 
September 20.389 On October 11, Congress referred the letter to a 
committee for consideration.390 But Congress took no further action for 
several months. 
O.  The Constitutional Convention of 1787 
It is commonly said that the Constitutional Convention was called by 
Congress for the sole purpose of recommending changes in the Articles 
of Confederation, and that by writing an entirely new Constitution the 
delegates exceeded their authority. The claim was first raised during the 
ratification debates by opponents of the Constitution—and not always in 
good faith.391   
The facts are otherwise: Congress did not call the Constitutional 
Convention, Congress had no power to limit its scope, and the 
overwhelming majority of delegates did not exceed their authority. 
The commissioners at the Annapolis Convention had recommended 
to the five states they represented that those states “concur, and use their 
endeavours to procure the concurrence of the other States, in the 
appointment of Commissioners, to meet at Philadelphia. . . .”392 
Arguably, this represented the formal call to Philadelphia. If not, the 
call had come by November 23, 1786 from the Virginia and New Jersey 
legislatures.393 
The Virginia resolution of that date was similar to state calls for at 
least two prior conventions in that the invitation was implied in the 
                                                                                                                     
 387. Even when states began to entitle their basic laws as “constitutions,” they often 
included the more established titles as well. E.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776 (“Constitution, or System 
of Government”); MD. CONST. of 1776 (“Constitution and Form of Government”); MASS. 
CONST. of 1780, pmbl. (“declaration of rights and frame of government as the constitution”); VA 
CONST. of 1776 (“Constitution or Form of Government”). 
 388. Infra Part III.N. 
 389. See 31 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 677–80. 
 390. Id. at 770. 
 391. See, e.g., A Georgian, GAZETTE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted 
in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 236–37 (an anti-federalist tract that misrepresents 
the delegates’ authority by substituting “the articles of confederation” for “the federal 
constitution” in quoting their commission). 
 392. Proceedings, supra note 385 and accompanying text. 
 393. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559, 563.  
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appointment of commissioners.394 It read as follows: 
Be It Therefore Enacted . . . that seven Commissioners be 
appointed by joint Ballot of both Houses of Assembly who 
or any three of them are hereby authorized as Deputies 
from this Commonwealth to meet such Deputies as may be 
appointed and authorized by other States to assemble in 
Convention at Philadelphia as above recommended and to 
join with them in devising and discussing all such 
Alterations and farther Provisions as may be necessary to 
render the Foederal [sic] Constitution adequate to the 
Exigencies of the Union and in reporting such an Act for 
that purpose to the United States in Congress as when 
agreed to by them and duly confirmed by the several States 
will effectually provide for the same.395 
This resolution followed the Annapolis formula in suggesting that 
the convention propose any “Alterations and farther Provisions as may 
be necessary to render the Foederal [sic] Constitution [i.e., the political 
system]396 adequate.” Perhaps significantly, the language provided not 
for approval by every state (as had the Annapolis recommendation), but 
by the “several [individual] States”—leaving open the possibility that 
changes could bind the assenting states even in the absence of 
unanimous approval. This was a formula for a convention with 
plenipotentiary, rather than limited, proposal power.397 
On November 23, 1786, the same day Virginia acted, New Jersey 
commissioned several delegates “for the purpose of taking into 
Consideration the state of the Union, as to trade and other important 
objects, and of devising such other Provisions as shall appear to be 
necessary to render the Constitution of the Federal Government 
adequate to the exigencies thereof.”398 New Jersey made no mention of 
consent by Congress or the other states. 
On December 30, the Pennsylvania legislature also decided to send 
commissioners to Philadelphia, reciting as a reason the prior resolution 
of Virginia and empowering its delegates according to the Virginia 
                                                                                                                     
 394. E.g., AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 138 and accompanying text (quoting the call 
for the 1776–77 Providence Convention); Proceedings, supra note 333 and accompanying text 
(discussing the call for the 1781 Providence Convention). 
 395. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559–60 . 
 396. Supra Part III.M. 
 397. Cf. Letter from James Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2, 1788), in 5 
MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 297, 299 (distinguishing between a convention recurring 
to “first principles,” which depends on the unanimous consent of the parties who are to be 
bound by it and a convention for proposing amendments under “the forms of the Constitution,” 
binding even non-consenting states). 
 398. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 563. 
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formula.399 By mid-February of the following year, North Carolina, 
New Hampshire, Delaware, and Georgia (in that order) also had 
selected commissioners, or authorized the selection of 
commissioners.400 All granted them broad power to propose reform, and 
none limited them to merely proposing changes in the Articles.401 Thus, 
seven states already had enlisted in the cause, and none had restricted its 
delegates to revising the Articles. 
On February 21, 1787, the congressional committee to which 
Dickinson’s Annapolis letter had been entrusted moved that Congress 
“strongly recommend” to the states that they send delegates to a 
convention that would devise “such farther provisions as shall render 
the same adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”402 At that point, the 
New York congressional delegates, citing their instructions, objected. 
They moved to postpone the committee report, and they offered a 
resolution by which Congress would recommend to the states a 
convention only “for the purpose of revising the Articles of 
Confederation.”403 Their insistence on that wording confirms that 
people understood that the convention recommended by the delegates at 
Annapolis, endorsed by seven states, and promoted by the congressional 
committee was not limited to proposing changes in the Articles. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 399. Id. at 565–66 (directing commissioners “to meet such Deputies as may be appointed 
and authorized by the other States, to assemble in the said Convention at the City aforesaid, and 
to join with them in devising, deliberating on, and discussing, all such alterations and further 
Provisions, as may be necessary to render the foederal [sic] Constitution fully adequate to the 
exigencies of the Union”). 
 400. 3 id. at 567–77. 
 401. E.g., id. at 568 (showing that North Carolina elected its delegates in January 1787); id. 
at 571–72 (showing the New Hampshire resolution passing on January 17, 1787); id. at 574 
(showing the Delaware authorization as passing on February 3, 1787); id. at 576–77 
(reproducing the Georgia ordinance, adopted February 10, 1787). 
The wording of each commission varied somewhat, with some phrases repeating 
themselves: 
North Carolina: “for the purpose of revising the Foederal [sic] Constitution . . . To hold, 
exercise and enjoy the appointment aforesaid, with all Powers, Authorities and Emoluments to 
the same belonging or in any wise appertaining.” Id. at 567–68. 
New Hampshire: “devising & discussing all such alterations & further provisions as to render 
the federal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union.” Id. at 572. 
Delaware: “deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and further Provisions as may be 
necessary to render the Foederal [sic] Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union.” Id. 
at 574. 
Georgia: “devising and discussing all such Alterations and farther Provisions as may be 
necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union.” Id. at 56–
77. 
 402. 32 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 71–72 (Feb. 21, 1787). 
 403. Id. at 72. 
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New York’s motion to postpone was defeated, with only three states 
voting in favor.404 However, Massachusetts then successfully obtained a 
postponement, and offered a substitute resolution.405 This resolution 
was adopted.406 
Notably, the successful resolution neither “called” a convention nor 
made a recommendation. In fact, it omitted the language of 
recommendation in the committee proposal and in the New York 
motion. The adopted resolution merely asserted that “in the opinion of 
Congress it is expedient” that a convention be 
held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of 
revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to 
Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and 
provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and 
confirmed by the States render the federal Constitution 
adequate to the exigencies of Government and the 
preservation of the Union.407 
It is, perhaps, truly extraordinary that so many writers have repeated 
the claim that Congress called the Constitutional Convention and legally 
limited its scope. First, the Confederation Congress had no power to 
issue a legally-binding call.408 If the states decided to convene, as a 
matter of law they—not Congress—fixed the scope of their delegates’ 
authority.409 Second, the Articles gave Congress no power to limit that 
scope. To be sure, Congress, like any agent, could recommend to its 
principals a course of action outside congressional authority. But this is 
not the same as legally restricting the scope of a convention. Third, by 
its specific wording the congressional resolution was not even a 
recommendatory call or restriction. As shown above, Congress dropped 
the formal term “recommend” in favor of expressing “the opinion of 
Congress.” 
Despite Congress’s expression of its “opinion,” none of the seven 
states that had decided to participate in the convention narrowed their 
commissions. On the contrary, the list of states favoring a 
plenipotentiary proposing convention continued to grow. Connecticut, 
Maryland, and South Carolina all gave their delegates broad authority to 
                                                                                                                     
 404. Id. at 73. 
 405. Id. at 73–74. 
 406. Id. at 73. 
 407. Id. at 74 (internal footnote omitted). 
 408. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778, art. II (“Each State retains its sovereignty, 
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
confederation, expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”). 
 409. See CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 97; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 1, at 
199 (James Madison). 
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propose.410 Only Massachusetts and New York restricted their 
commissions to amending the Articles.411 This is why, during the 
convention proceedings it was a Massachusetts delegate, Elbridge 
Gerry, who questioned to that assembly’s authority venture beyond 
changes in the Articles,412 and why two of the three New York delegates 
left early.413 Of the 39 delegates who signed the Constitution, only 
three—Rufus King and Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts and 
Alexander Hamilton of New York414—could be charged credibly with 
exceeding their powers. 
The credentials of the Delaware commissioners, while broad enough 
to authorize scrapping most of the Articles, did impose an important 
limitation: they were not to agree to any changes that altered the rule 
that “in the United States in Congress Assembled each State shall have 
one Vote.”415 However, the Constitution’s bicameral Federal Congress 
was a very different entity with very different powers than the 
Confederation’s “United States, in Congress Assembled,”416 so the 
Delaware delegates could maintain that they had stayed within their 
commissions. Moreover, any convention delegate could point out that 
the law permitted an agent to recommend to his principals a course of 
action outside the agent’s sphere of authority; such recommendations 
merely had no legal effect.417 As James Wilson summed up the 
delegates’ position, they were “authorized to conclude nothing, 
                                                                                                                     
 410. Connecticut resolved that 
for the purposes mentioned in the said Act of Congress that may be present and 
duly empowered to act in said Convention, and to discuss upon such 
Alterations and Provisions agreeable to the general principles of Republican 
Government as they shall think proper to render the federal Constitution 
adequate to the exigencies of Government and, the preservation of the Union. 
3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 585 (emphasis added). Maryland gave its 
delegates authority to “consider[] such Alterations and further Provisions as may be 
necessary to render the Foederal [sic] Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the 
Union.” Id. at 586. Finally, South Carolina granted authority for “devising and 
discussing all such Alterations, Clauses, Articles and Provisions, as may be thought 
necessary to render the Foederal [sic] Constitution entirely adequate to the actual 
Situation and future good Government of the confederated States.” Id. at 581. 
 411. Id. at 584–85 (reproducing Massachusetts credentials); id. at 579–80 (reproducing 
New York credentials). 
 412. See 2 id. at 42–43. 
 413. See 1 id. at xiv (editor’s comments). 
 414.  The charge is less credible with respect to Hamilton than with respect to King and 
Gorham. Because the majority of his delegation had gone home, arguably Hamilton no longer 
could act as a commissioner from New York and signed, therefore, only as an individual. 
 415. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 574–75 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 416. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778, art. II. 
 417. Natelson, Rules, supra note 1, at 723. 
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but . . . at liberty to propose any thing.”418 
The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 was the largest meeting its 
kind since the First Continental Congress, including 55 commissioners 
from 12 states.419 It also lasted more than three and a half months, 
longer than any other American eighteenth century multi-government 
convention.420 Because of the quality of its deliberation, the 
completeness of its record, and the quality of its product, it deservedly 
has become the most famous meeting of its kind. 
Yet in other ways it was unremarkable. The composition, protocols, 
rules, and prerogatives of the convention were well within the pattern 
set by prior multi-colonial and multi-state gatherings. This was to be 
expected, since at least 17 commissioners in Philadelphia had attended 
prior multi-government conventions. Some particularly influential 
delegates, such as John Dickinson, Roger Sherman, and Oliver 
Ellsworth, were veterans of several. 
As was true of prior assemblies of this kind, the overwhelming 
majority of delegates at Philadelphia were selected by the state 
legislatures.421 The only exception occurred when Governor Edmund 
Randolph of Virginia selected James McClurg to replace Patrick Henry 
(who had refused to serve), in accordance with a legislative 
authorization to the governor to fill vacancies.422 As at prior 
conventions, the delegates all were empowered through commissions 
issued by their respective states, and were subject to additional state 
instructions. All but a handful of delegates remained within the scope of 
their authority or, if that was no longer possible, returned home.423 
As in prior multi-government conventions, the rule of suffrage was 
one vote per state committee. As at previous conventions, the journal 
listed states from north to south, and they voted in that order. As in all 
the previous conventions discussed in this Part III other than the Albany 
Congress, the assembly elected its own president from among the 
commissioners present—in this case, George Washington.424 In 
accordance with established custom also, the Constitutional Convention 
                                                                                                                     
 418. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 253. Wilson’s use of “proposed” here means 
“recommend.” This should not be confused with the technical term employed in Article V. See 
Natelson, Rules, supra note 1, Part XI.A. 
 419. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 557–59. 
 420. 1 id. at xi (introductory notes).  
 421. 3 id. at 559–86 (reproducing credentials). 
 422. 2 id. at 562–63. 
 423. Thus, Robert Yates and Robert Lansing, two of the three commissioners from New 
York (which had granted them only limited authority) returned home early. ROSSITER, supra 
note 1, at 252. Caleb Strong from Massachusetts, another state granting only limited authority, 
also left early. Id. at 211  
 424. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
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elected its own secretary, William Jackson, and other officers.425 In 
choosing a secretary, it followed the usual practice of selecting a non-
delegate. 
As previous gatherings had done, the Constitutional Convention 
adopted its own rules,426 kept its own journal, established and staffed its 
own committees,427 and fixed its periods of recess and adjournment. In 
fundamental structure, protocol, and practices, there were few, if any, 
innovations. 
IV.  DID PRIOR MULTI-GOVERNMENT CONVENTIONS FORM THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL FOR THE AMENDMENTS CONVENTION? 
The legal force of the Constitution’s words and phrases depends, at 
least in part (and some would argue “entirely”), on the meaning of the 
words communicated to the ratifiers when they approved the 
document.428 What the words communicated included not only their 
strict meaning, but the attributes and incidents implied by them. Hence 
the modern observer needs to consult contemporaneous customs and 
usages to understand the words fully. 
The phrase “Convention for proposing Amendments” denoted a 
general convention.429 To be “general” it was not necessary that every 
state participate, or even that every state be invited. The founding 
generation had experienced four gatherings then called general 
conventions—the Stamp Act Congress, the First Continental Congress, 
the Constitutional Convention, and the Philadelphia Price Convention, 
and none included every British colony in North America nor every 
state. The criterion that rendered a convention “general” rather than 
“partial” was not that every colony or state participated, but that the 
convention was not limited by region (at least not entirely)430—and that 
most colonies or states did take part. 
This renders it easier to understand that in all attributes other than 
inclusivity, a general convention was the same creature as a regional or 
“partial” convention. The critical line of distinction was not between 
                                                                                                                     
 425. Id. at 2. As befits the relatively large size and long duration of the convention, the 
delegates also selected a doorkeeper and messenger. 15 PA. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 351.  
 426. See generally 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 8–13, 15–16 (listing rules and 
James Madison recounting rulemaking proceedings). 
 427. E.g., id. at 16 (resolving into committee of the whole). 
 428. See generally Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007) (arguing that standard 
Founding-Era methods of interpretation would require that the Constitution be interpreted 
according to the understating or the ratifiers, if coherent and available; and if not according to 
the original public meaning of the document). 
 429. Supra note 63 and accompanying text (defining “general convention”). 
 430. The call to the Philadelphia Price Convention included the southern states of 
Maryland and Virginia, but excluded the Carolinas and Georgia. Supra Part III.H. 
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general and partial, but between multi-government and intra-
governmental. Multi-government conventions were diplomatic meetings 
of commissioners empowered by their respective governments, and they 
had common characteristics (such as “one committee/one vote”) that 
distinguished them from intrastate meetings. 
Whether those common characteristics were incorporated into the 
Constitution’s phrase “Convention for proposing Amendments” 
depends on whether the “Convention for proposing Amendments” was 
based on its multi-government predecessors. Put another way, was the 
amendments convention to be same sort of entity that prior multi-
government conventions had been? Or did the Framers and Ratifiers 
contemplate that the phrase “Convention for proposing Amendments” 
might permit procedures and protocols entirely new? 
The historical record on this point is nearly as clear as historical 
records ever are: The Founders contemplated an amendments 
convention fitting the universally-established model. 
The first reason for believing this is the fact that there was a 
universally-established model. The diplomatic meeting among 
committees commissioned by their respective governments was the only 
sort of multi-jurisdictional convention—general or partial—known to 
the Founders. This model was not only universal but very well 
ingrained. As noted throughout Part III, the attendance rosters of these 
meetings show considerable overlap, and included many leading 
Founders. Among the Framers at the Constitutional Convention, Roger 
Sherman of Connecticut was attending his fifth multi-government 
convention. Delaware’s John Dickinson was attending his fourth. 
Sherman’s Connecticut colleague Oliver Ellsworth, Dickinson’s 
colleague George Read, South Carolina’s John Rutledge, and Nathaniel 
Gorham of Massachusetts all were attending their third. At least eleven 
other Framers were serving at their second: Madison, Franklin, 
Washington, Richard Bassett, Elbridge Gerry, Alexander Hamilton, 
William C. Houston, William Livingston, Thomas Miflin, Edmund 
Randolph, and William Samuel Johnson. These veterans influenced the 
Constitution to a degree disproportionate to their numbers,431 and most 
were leaders in the ratification debates. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 431. Madison is usually accounted the delegate with the most impact. Among other 
convention alumni, Washington served as convention president; Gorham chaired the committee 
of the whole and was one of five members of the Committee of Detail, which prepared the 
Constitution’s first draft; Randolph presented the Virginia Plan and served on the Committee of 
Detail; Rutledge chaired that committee; Johnson was on the Committee of Style, which 
prepared the final version of the Constitution; Franklin kept the gathering humane and civil; and 
Dickinson, Ellsworth, Johnson, and Sherman were all key convention moderates who negotiated 
crucial settlements such as the Connecticut [“Great”] Compromise. 
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Many other leaders in the ratification debates were veterans of multi-
government conventions as well. Jabez Bowen, a prominent Federalist, 
had represented Rhode Island in the New Haven and second Providence 
conventions, and he chaired the latter meeting. William Paca of 
Maryland, a moderate Anti-Federalist and central figure in the fight for 
amendments, had attended the First Continental Congress and the 
Philadelphia Price Convention. Thomas McKean, second only to James 
Wilson as a Federalist spokesman at the Pennsylvania ratifying 
convention, had served in the Stamp Act Congress and with Paca at the 
New Haven and second Providence conclaves. Azor Orne (first 
Providence and second Hartford conventions) and Tristam Dalton (first 
Providence) served as delegates to the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention.432 Finally, ratifiers who had not attended multi-government 
gatherings but had served in Congress, in state legislatures, or in state 
executive office had been involved in convention selection procedures 
or had read convention reports. 
Thus the Founders, either by personal experience or second-hand 
communication, all were familiar with a single multi-government 
model, and knew no other. 
Nor did anything in the Constitution suggest that a “Convention for 
proposing Amendments” would follow any other than the universally-
established pattern. The Constitution says nothing to indicate that an 
amendments convention would be popularly elected like the House of 
Representatives, for example; or that Congress could set the rules or 
supervise its composition. On the contrary, where the Constitution does 
provide rules it does so precisely in those few areas where existing 
practice had permitted variations. This point is explored further below 
in the Conclusion. 
Those facts should be sufficient to close the question, but there are 
still more indicators pointing in the same direction. One of these is the 
fundamental reason the convention-proposal method was included in 
Article V: as a way of proposing amendments without congressional 
interference. If an amendments convention were to follow any model 
other than that established by precedent, the model likely would have to 
be specified by Congress, presumably as part of the congressional call. 
But allowing Congress to determine the composition and rules of the 
convention would cede to Congress significant power over the 
convention-proposal method, thereby frustrating its central purpose. 
Departing from the Founding-Era model, therefore, makes no sense as a 
matter of constitutional interpretation. 
That Congress would have only a ministerial role in the process was 
                                                                                                                     
 432. 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1155 (listing Massachusetts ratifying 
convention delegates). 
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confirmed during the ratification debates by the influential Federalist 
Tench Coxe. Through the state application and convention procedure, 
he wrote, the states could obtain amendments “although the President, 
Senate and Federal House of Representatives, should be unanimously 
opposed to each and all of them.”433 This representation was flatly 
inconsistent with a power in Congress to manipulate convention 
composition or rules. 
Madison’s Federalist No. 43 contains a comment also inconsistent 
with any but the traditional model. This is the observation that the 
Constitution “equally enables the general and the State governments to 
originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the 
experience on one side, or on the other.”434 Of course, the only way for 
the state governments to be “equally enable[d]” with Congress in the 
proposal process is if the convention is a meeting of representatives 
from those state governments. Mere power to apply for a convention 
outside state control would not fit Madison’s criterion. 
That the states in convention assembled were the true proposers is 
assumed in other ratification-era writings as well. A Federalist writing 
as “Cassius” asserted that “the states may propose any alterations which 
they see fit, and that Congress shall take measures for having them 
                                                                                                                     
 433. Tench Coxe, A Friend of Society and Liberty, PA. GAZETTE, July 23, 1788, reprinted 
in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 277, 284 (emphasis in original). 
 434. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 1, at 275 (James Madison). Similarly, at the North 
Carolina ratifying convention, the following colloquy took place: 
Mr. BASS observed, that it was plain that the introduction of amendments 
depended altogether on Congress. 
Mr. IREDELL replied, that it was very evident that it did not depend on the 
will of Congress; for that the legislatures of two thirds of the states were 
authorized to make application for calling a convention to propose 
amendments, and, on such application, it is provided that Congress shall call 
such convention, so that they will have no option. 
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 178. 
During the debates in New York, John Lansing, Jr., a former delegate to the federal 
convention, gave additional reasons for the alternative routes to amendment: 
In the one instance we submit the propriety of making amendments to men who 
are sent, some of them for six years, from home, and who lose that knowledge 
of the wishes of the people by absence, which men more recently from them, in 
case of a convention, would naturally possess. Besides, the Congress, if they 
propose amendments, can only communicate their reasons to their constituents 
by letter, while if the amendments are made by men sent for the express 
purpose, when they return from the convention, they can detail more 
satisfactorily, and explicitly the reasons that operated in favour of such and 
such amendments—and the people will be able to enter into the views of the 
convention, and better understand the propriety of acceding to their proposition. 
23 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2522–24. 
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carried into effect.”435 Again, for the states to “propose,” the convention 
must be their instrumentality. Similarly, Samuel Jones, a supporter of 
the Constitution, explained Article V this way: 
The reason why there are two modes of obtaining 
amendments prescribed by the constitution I suppose to be 
this—it could not be known to the framers of the 
constitution, whether there was too much power given by it 
or too little; they therefore prescribed a mode by which 
Congress might procure more, if in the operation of the 
government it was found necessary; and they prescribed for 
the states a mode of restraining the powers of the 
government, if upon trial it should be found they had given 
too much.436 
Jones thus tells us that the procedure gives the states a “mode of 
restraining the powers of government.” The states do not share that 
mode with others; the Constitution “prescribe[s]” that they have it. This 
can be true only if the convention is their assembly. 
Further evidence on the point comes from the spring of 1789, when 
the First Federal Congress had assembled, eleven of the original thirteen 
states had ratified, but North Carolina and Rhode Island had not yet 
done so. Those two states, as well as Virginia and New York, were still 
unsatisfied with the Constitution as written, and wanted early action on 
amendments, particularly a Bill of Rights. Virginia and New York both 
applied for a convention to propose amendments.437 The Virginia 
application demanded 
that a convention be immediately called, of deputies from 
the several States, with full power to take into their 
consideration the defects of this Constitution that have been 
suggested by the State Conventions, and report such 
amendments thereto as they shall find best suited to 
promote our common interests, and secure to ourselves and 
our latest posterity, the great and unalienable rights of 
mankind.438 
The italicized language reveals the assumption that an amendments 
convention was state-based, and was similar to language that long had 
                                                                                                                     
 435. Cassius VI, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1787, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 511–12 (emphasis added). 
 436. 23 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2520–22 (Feb. 4, 1789) (emphasis 
added). 
 437. See CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 35–39. 
 438. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 28–29 (1789) (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
70
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1
2013] THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS” 685 
 
been used to denominate an interstate convention.439 It paralleled the 
language of the Massachusetts application and accompanying letter sent 
to Congress in 1785 (“Convention of Delegates from all the States” and 
“Convention of the States”).440 Thus, in the view of the Virginia 
legislature, the Constitution had not changed the nature of a multi-
government convention. 
The New York application similarly asked 
that a Convention of Deputies from the several States be 
called as early as possible, with full powers to take the said 
Constitution into their consideration, and to propose such 
amendments thereto, as they shall find best calculated to 
promote our common interests, and secure to ourselves and 
our latest posterity, the great and unalienable rights of 
mankind.441 
One might, perhaps, argue that the view of Virginia and New York 
were atypical, but in fact they were not. Already quoted have been 
several corroborative comments from the ratification debates. The 
legislature of Federalist Pennsylvania declined to join the applications 
of Virginia and New York, but in its resolution doing so it also assumed 
the pre-constitutional model, referring to the proposed gathering as a 
convention of the states.442 This remained for many years a common 
method of designating an amendments convention.443 Over four decades 
later, the Supreme Court still referred to such a gathering an as “a 
convention of the states.”444 
I have been able to find no Founding-Era evidence suggesting that a 
convention for proposing amendments was anything else. 
                                                                                                                     
 439. E.g., 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 578 (reproducing a resolution of the 1780 
Philadelphia Price Convention, referring to it as a “meeting of the several States”). 
 440. 1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 666 (July 1, 1785) (“Convention of 
Delegates from all the States”); id. at 667 (accompanying letter to president of Congress 
describing the meeting as a “Convention of the States”). 
 441. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 29–30 (1789) (emphasis added). 
 442. William Russell Pullen, The Application Clause of the Amending Provision of the 
Constitution 23 (1951) (unpublished dissertation, University of North Carolina) (on file with 
University Library, University of North Carolina and with author) (“[T]he calling of a 
convention of the states for amending the foederal [sic] constitution.” (quoting MINUTES OF THE 
GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PA., 58–61, (1789))). By contrast, a convention within a state was referred 
to as a “Convention of the people.” Id. at 26 (quoting a South Carolina report recommending 
against applying for an Article V convention). 
 443. Pullen, supra note 372, at 528; see also Natelson, First Century, supra note 1, at 5, 7, 
12 (providing other examples). 
 444. Smith v. Union Bank of Georgetown, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 518, 528 (1831). 
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CONCLUSION: WHAT PRIOR CONVENTIONS TELL US ABOUT THE 
CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS 
As noted above, Founding-Era customs assist us in understanding 
the attributes and procedures inherent in a “convention for proposing 
amendments,” and the powers and prerogatives of the actors in the 
process.445 This Conclusion draws on the historical material collected 
above, together with the brief constitutional text, to outline those 
attributes and procedures. 
The previous record of American conventions made it clear that a 
convention for proposing amendments was to be, like its immediate 
predecessors, an inter-governmental diplomatic gathering—a 
“convention of the states” or “convention of committees.” It was to be a 
forum in which state delegations could meet on the basis of sovereign 
equality. Its purpose is to put the “states in convention assembled” on 
equal footing with Congress in proposing amendments.446 
Founding-Era practice informs us that Article V applications and 
calls may ask for either a plenipotentiary convention or one limited to 
pre-defined subjects. Most American multi-government gatherings had 
been limited to one or more subjects, and the ratification-era record 
shows affirmatively that the Founders expected that most conventions 
for proposing amendments would be similarly limited.447 Founding-Era 
practice informs us also that commissioners at an amendments 
convention were to operate under agency law and remain within the 
limits of their commissions.448 Neither the record of Founding Era 
conventions nor the ratification debates offer significant support for the 
modern claim449 that a convention cannot be limited. 
                                                                                                                     
 445. Supra notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text. 
 446. The modern perception that the Constitution does not give the states parity with 
Congress in the amendment process has induced some commentators to propose abolishing the 
convention system in favor of a system in which a certain number of states directly propose an 
amendment by agreeing on its precise language. See, e.g., Why the Medison Amendment?, THE 
MADISON AMENDMENT, http://www.madisonamendment.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). A 
correct understanding of the convention process makes clear that the states already occupy an 
equal position. 
 447. See Natelson, Rules, supra note 1, at 727–30. 
 448. Supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 449. Those pressing this claim invariably do so with little or no consideration of either the 
prior history of multi-government conventions or the ratification record. See, e.g., Bruce M. Van 
Sickle & Lynn M. Boughley, A Lawful and Peaceful Revolution: Article V and Congress’ 
Present Duty to Call a Convention for Proposing Amendments, 14 HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (1990). 
This article does not discuss, or even reference, eighteenth century convention practice, and its  
treatment of the “limitability” issue in the ratification record is limited to a single quotation by 
Alexander Hamilton. Id. at 32–33 & 45–46. Its principal argument is that the applying states 
cannot limit a convention to one subject because the Constitution provides for the convention to 
propose “amendments” (plural). Id. at 28, 45. This is like saying that when a speaker seeks 
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The only Founding Era efforts to insert in a convention call 
prescriptions other than time, place, and subject-matter were abortive. 
When Massachusetts presumed to set the voting rules while calling a 
third Hartford convention, two of the four states invited refused to 
participate.450 In the few instances in which convention calls suggested 
how sovereign governments should select their commissioners, some of 
those governments disregarded the suggestions, but their commissioners 
were seated anyway.451 This record therefore suggests that a convention 
call, as the Constitution uses the term, may not include legally-binding 
terms other than time, place, and subject. However, the occasional 
Founding-Era practice of making calls and applications conditional and 
of rescinding them452 suggests that Article V applications and calls also 
may be made conditional or rescinded.453 In accordance with Founding-
Era practice, states are free to honor or reject calls, as they choose.  
Universal pre-constitutional practice tells us that states may select, 
commission, instruct, and pay their delegates as they wish, and may 
alter their instructions and recall them. Although the states may define 
the subject and instruct their commissioners to vote in a certain way, the 
convention as a whole makes its own rules, elects its own officers, 
establishes and staffs its own committees, and sets its own time of 
adjournment. 
All Founding-Era conventions were deliberative bodies. This was 
true to a certain extent even of conventions whose formal power was 
limited to an up-or-down vote. When Rhode Island lawmakers 
submitted the Constitution to a statewide referendum in town meetings 
rather than to a ratifying convention, a principal criticism was that the 
referendum lacked the deliberative qualities of the convention.454 Critics 
contended that a ratifying convention, unlike a referendum, provided a 
central forum for a full hearing and debate and exchange of information 
among people from different locales.455 They further contended that the 
                                                                                                                     
“questions” from the audience, if those in the audience have only one question they may not ask 
it. 
 450. Supra Part III.M. 
 451. Supra Parts III.B (Stamp Act Congress) & III.J (Boston Convention).  
 452. Supra notes 136, 305, & 310 (conditional calls) and 342 (rescinded call), and 
accompanying text. 
 453. Cf. Natelson, Rules, supra note 1, at 712 (conditions and rescissions probably 
permitted). 
 454. E.g., Report of Rhode Island Legislature, U.S. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1788, reprinted in 24 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 131–32; A Freeman, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, Mar. 15, 
1788, reprinted in id. at 137; A Freeman, NEWPORT HERALD, Apr. 3, 1788, reprinted in id. at 
220–22; A Rhode Island Landholder, PROVIDENCE U. S. CHRON., Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in id., 
at 146–47; Providence Town Meeting: Petition to General Assembly of March 26, U.S. CHRON.,  
Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in id. at 193–98. 
 455. Report of Rhode Island Legislature, U.S. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1788, reprinted in 24 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 131 (stating that the referendum, “though it gave 
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convention offered a way to supplement the affirmative or negative vote 
with non-binding recommendations for amendments.456 
Before and during the Founding Era, American multi-government 
conventions enjoyed even more deliberative freedom than ratifying 
conventions—as, indeed, befits the dignity of a diplomatic gathering of 
sovereignties. No multi-government convention was limited to an up-or-
down vote. Each was assigned discrete problems to work on, but within 
that sphere each enjoyed freedom to deliberate, advise, consult, confer, 
recommend, and propose. Multi-government conventions also could 
refuse to propose.457 Essentially, they served as task forces where 
delegates from different states could share information, debate, compare 
notes, and try to hammer out creative solutions to the problems posed to 
them. 
History and the constitutional text inform us that a convention for 
proposing amendments is, like its direct predecessors, a multi-
government proposing convention. This suggests that an amendments 
convention is deliberative in much the same way its predecessors 
were.458 This suggests further that when a legislature attempts in its 
                                                                                                                     
every person an opportunity to enter his assent or dissent, precluded all the before-mentioned 
advantages arising from a general Convention, and excluded the light and information which 
one part of the State could afford to the other by means thereof”); Providence Town Meeting: 
Petition to General Assembly of March 26, U.S. CHRON.,  Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in id. at 193, 
196. 
 456. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (Apr. 8, 1788), in 24 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 226 (criticizing the referendum because it “precludes every result but 
that of a total adoption or rejection”); Report of Rhode Island Legislature, U.S. CHRON., Mar. 6, 
1788, reprinted in id. at 132 (stating that Rhode Island lost the opportunity to deliberate at the 
Constitutional Convention, and also lost the opportunity to deliberate over amendments at a 
ratifying convention); A Rhode Island Landholder, PROVIDENCE U. S. CHRON., Mar. 20, 1788, 
reprinted in id. at 146–50; Providence Town Meeting: Petition to General Assembly of March 
26, U.S. CHRON.,  Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in id. at 193, 97; see Amendment, PROVIDENCE 
GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1788, reprinted in id. at 218. 
 457. Supra notes 221 and accompanying text See also supra notes 181 & 182 and 
accompanying text (relating the York Town convention’s failure to propose). Madison explicitly 
recognized an amendments convention’s prerogative not to propose. Letter from James Madison 
to Philip Mazzei, Dec. 10, 1788, 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 388, 389 (Robert A. 
Rutland & Charles F. Hobson, eds. 1977). 
 458. Modern case law is consistent in requiring that legislatures and conventions operating 
under Article V have some deliberative freedom. See, e.g., Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 226–
27 (1920); Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1123 (8th Cir. 1999); Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 
911, 924–25 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 510, 527 (2001); Barker v. 
Hazetine, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1094 (D.S.D. 1998) (“Without doubt, Initiated Measure 1 brings 
to bear an undue influence on South Dakota’s congressional candidates, and the deliberative and 
independent amendment process envisioned by the Framers when they drafted Article V is 
lost.”); League of Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52, 58 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan v. 
Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 127 (Ark. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997) (requiring an 
assembly that can engage in “intellectual debate, deliberation, or consideration”); AFL-CIO v. 
Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 621–22 (Cal. 1984), stay denied sub nom. Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310 
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application to compel the convention to merely vote up-or-down on 
prescribed language,459 it is not utilizing the application power in a valid 
way. 
Prevailing convention practice during the Founding Era permitted a 
few procedural variations, and it is precisely in these areas that the text 
of Article V prescribes procedure. Specifically: 
•   During the Founding Era, multi-state conventions could be 
authorized merely to propose solutions for state approval, or, 
less commonly, to resolve issues; in the latter case each state 
“pledged its faith” to comply with the outcome. Article V 
clarifies that an amendments convention only may propose. At 
the Constitutional Convention, the Framers rejected proffered 
language to create an amendments convention that could 
resolve.460 
•   During the Founding Era, a proposing convention could be 
plenipotentiary or limited. Article V clarifies that neither the 
states nor Congress may call plenipotentiary conventions 
under Article V, because that Article authorizes only 
amendments to “this Constitution,” and, further, it proscribes 
certain amendments.461 
•   During the Founding Era, an “application” for a multi-
government convention could refer either to (1) a request from 
a state to Congress to call, or (2) the call itself. Article V 
clarifies that an application has only the former meaning.462 
•   During the Founding Era a call could come from one or more 
states, from Congress, or from another convention. Article V 
prescribes that the call for an amendments convention comes 
only from Congress, but is mandatory when two thirds of the 
states have submitted similar applications.463 
                                                                                                                     
(1984); State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 829–30 (Mont. 1984); In re Opinion of 
the Justices, 167 A. 176, 180 (Me. 1933); cf. Kimble v. Swackhamer, 439 U.S. 1385, 1387 
(1978)  (Rehnquist, J.), dismissing appeal from 439 U.S. 1041 (upholding a referendum on an 
Article V question because it was advisory rather than mandatory); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 
1291, 1308–09 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (Stevens, J.) (upholding a rule of state law on an Article V 
assembly, but only because the assembly voluntarily adopted it). 
 459. E.g., 133 CONG. REC. S4183 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1987) (reproducing Utah application 
specifying precise text of amendment). 
 460. Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 9. 
 461. U.S. CONST. art. V (“Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the 
Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth 
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
 462. U.S. CONST. art. V (“[O]n the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the 
several States, [Congress] shall call.”). 
 463. U.S. CONST. art. V (“or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the 
several States, [Congress] shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments”). 
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•   During the Founding Era, one proposing convention (that of 
1787) had attempted to specify how the states were to review 
its recommendations. Article V clarifies that an amendments 
convention does not have this power.464 
Thus do text and history fit together to guide us in the use of 
Article V. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 464. U.S. CONST. art. V (“[Congress’s call for a convention], in either Case, shall be valid 
to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three 
fourths of the several States, or by Convention in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.”). 
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